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Combating Cyber-Victimization
Jacqueline D Lipton, Ph.D.*
Abstract
In today’s interconnected society, high profile examples of
online victimization abound. Cyber-bullies, stalkers and
harassers launch attacks on the less powerful, causing a
variety of harms. Recent scholarship has identified some of
the more salient damage, including reputational harms,
severe emotional distress, loss of employment, and physical
assault. Extreme cases of online abuse have resulted in death
through suicide or as a result of targeted attacks. This article
makes two major contributions to the cyber-victimization
literature. It proposes specific reforms to criminal and tort
laws to address this conduct more effectively. Further, it
situates those reforms within a new multi-modal regulatory
framework. This new approach advocates a combination of
enhanced public education initiatives, enhanced access to
effective reputation management services, the development of
more pro-bono reputation management strategies, reporting
hotlines, social norms, and industry self-regulation. The goal
is to combine law with other regulatory modalities in order to
facilitate the development of a more civil and accountable
global online society.
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Introduction
“Once, reputation was hard-earned and carefully guarded. Today, your
reputation can be created or destroyed in just a few clicks.” 1

Words can hurt. Whether true or false, whether spoken by friend or
frenemy,2 the cyber pen is mightier than the sword.3 In today’s networked
society, abusive online conduct such as cyberbullying and cyber harassment
can cause serious damage including severe emotional distress,4 loss of
employment,5 and worryingly physical violence6 or death.7 Thirteen year
1

MICHAEL FERTIK and DAVID THOMPSON, WILD WEST 2.0: HOW TO PROTECT AND
RESTORE YOUR ONLINE REPUTATION ON THE UNTAMED SOCIAL FRONTIER, 2 (2010).
2
“Frenemy” has been defined as “a person who pretends to be a friend but is
actually an enemy; a rival with which one maintains friendly relations” (see
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/frenemy, last viewed on June 6, 2010).
3
Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Responsibility of Net Users in MARK FACKLER and
ROBERT S. FORTNER (eds), ETHICS, GLOBAL COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA, 11
(forthcoming, 2010) (page refs to draft proofs) (“Words can wound. Words can hurt.
Words can move people to action.”).
4
See, for example, Jacqueline Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy
Paradigm for Digital Video, 95 IOWA LAW REVIEW 919 , 921-922 (2010) (“[Consider the
fate of “Star Wars Kid”,] a Canadian teenager who filmed himself playing with a golf ball
retriever as if it was a light-saber from the Star Wars movies…. His video was posted to
the Internet without his authorization. A variety of amateur video enthusiasts then adopted
it on services such as YouTube. They created many popular, but extremely humiliating,
mash-up videos of the youth. The young man ended up dropping out of school. He also
required psychiatric care, including a period of institutionalization at a children’s
psychiatric facility.”) [hereinafter, We, the Paparazzi]
5
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
61, 64 (2009) (“Victims who stop blogging or writing under their own names lose the
chance to build robust online reputations that could generate online and offline career
opportunities.”) [hereinafter, Cyber Civil Rights].
6
See, for example, BBC News, Cyber Bullies Target Girl, May 24, 2003, full text
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/nottinghamshire/2933894.stm, last
viewed on March 16, 2010 (“[The victim’s] family says there has been a two-year
campaign of intimidation and she has twice been attacked in school.”); Kara CarnleyMurrhee, Cyberbulling: Hot Air or Harmful Speech? Legislation Grapples With
Preventing Cyberbullying Without Squelching Students’ Free Speech, UF LAW, 17, 18
(Winter 2010) (describing case of 13 year old Hope Witsell who committed suicide after
being the victim of a “sexting” campaign – a variation of cyberbullying in which sexually
explicit images of the victim or sexually explicit messages about the victim are
disseminated over digital communications services) [hereinafter, Hot Air]; Danielle Keats
Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combatting Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICHIGAN
LAW REVIEW 373, 396-397 (2009) (“The online abuse inflicts significant economic,
emotional, and physical harm on women in much the same way that work-place sexual
harassment does.”) [hereinafter, Law’s Expressive Value]
7
Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIFORNIA L REV ___,
[14] (forthcoming, 2010) (“Today, the physical harm associated with information
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old Megan Meier who believed she had found a soul mate in the fictional
“Josh Evans” on MySpace was driven to suicide by his spurning words.8
This is but one of an increasing number of examples of abusive online
conduct.9 One in four teenagers reportedly experience cyberbullying.10
Sixty-five per cent of children know someone who has been the victim of
cyberbullying.11 A 2006 Pew Internet study found that one third of online
teenagers had been victims of online harassment and that forty per cent of
social network users have been cyberbullied.12
Online abuses –
cyberbullying, cyberstalking and cyberharassment – disproportionately

disclosures can involve murder.”) [hereinafter, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts].
8
Gordon Tokumatsu and Jonathan Lloyd, MySpace Case: “You’re the Kind of Boy
a Girl Would Kill Herself Over”, Jan. 26, 2009, NBC LOS ANGELES, available at
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local-beat/Woman-Testifies-About-Final-MessageSent-to-Teen.html, last viewed on March 15, 2010 (describing the last electronic message
sent by Megan Meier, the teenage victim of an infamous online cyberbullying incident
before she committed suicide by hanging herself in her closet). See also discussion of the
incident in Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 16-22; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in
Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 1373,
1385-6 (2009) (describing the Megan Meier incident and legal responses to it) [hereinafter,
John Doe].
9
For more examples of cyberbullying conduct involving school age children, see
http://www.slais.ubc.ca/courses/libr500/04-05-wt2/www/D_Jackson/examples.htm,
last
viewed on March 16, 2010; see also Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at
[10-11] (giving examples of high profile cases of online abuses).
10
Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 22.
11
id., at 23.
12
id.
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affect traditionally subordinated groups,13 notably women,14 children,15 and
minorities.16
The prevalence of this conduct suggests that more effective means
are necessary to redress online wrongs and to protect victims’ reputations.
Action against cyber-abusers has posed significant challenges for the legal
system. Because of the global and largely anonymous nature of the
Internet, reliance on the law will always be time-consuming and expensive
for victims. In the United States, many potential legal solutions will also
face First Amendment hurdles.
Unlike previous writing in this area, this article situates the law in a
broader regulatory context. The author makes specific suggestions for
reform of tort and criminal laws, but more importantly places the legal
debate into a larger multi-modal framework for protecting online
reputations. This new framework combines specific legal reforms with
extra-legal regulatory approaches, many of which will prove more
affordable and effective for victims of online wrongs. Part I explores the
categories of abusive online conduct that require regulatory attention:
cyberbullying, cyber harassment and cyberstalking. These categories are
contrasted with their offline counterparts. Part II identifies gaps in the
current law as applied to abusive online conduct. It focuses on criminal
law, tort law, and to some extent civil rights law. It suggests ways in which
current laws could be updated to more effectively combat online wrongs.

13

Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 65-66 (citing statistics from 2006
evidencing that cyber harassment is concentrated on women and to some extent also people
of color, religious minorities, gays, and lesbians).
14
Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online
Harassment, 32 HARVARD J L & GENDER 383, 392 (2009) (“As women gain visibility in
the blogosphere, they are the targets of sexual harassment and threats. Men are harassed
too, and lack of civility is an abiding problem on the Web. But women, who make up
about half the online community, are singled out in more starkly sexually threatening terms
– a trend that was first evident in chat rooms in the early 1990s and is now moving to the
blogosphere ….”); 394 (“Self-identifying as a woman online can substantially increase the
risk of Internet harassment.”); but note that some victims of online harassment are men:
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [14-15] (describing physical assaults
and murders of abortion doctors where website list of abortion doctors was involved in
identifying them); Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 6, at 378 (“While cyber
attackers target men, more often their victims are female.”).
15
Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 6, at 398 (noting that younger
individuals are particularly impacted by online abuses because their lives are “inextricably
tied to the net”).
16
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 65-66.
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Part III proposes extra-legal regulatory mechanisms that might
better protect individual reputations online. It surveys currently available
options, such as commercial reputation management services,17 along with
their shortcomings. It advocates developing educational programs to
empower victims of online abuses to utilize currently available legal and
technological means for protecting their online reputations. It also suggests
an increased role for reporting hotlines, evolving social norms, and industry
self-regulation through codes of conduct and “naming and shaming”
programs.
Part IV concludes by suggesting future directions in the regulation
of online abuses. The advantages of developing these extra-legal
approaches relate to easing the time and cost burdens on victims and
avoiding some of the First Amendment concerns raised by legislated
solutions. Additionally, development of these extra-legal avenues will
ultimately change the climate of online discourse and facilitate a more civil
and accountable global online society where service providers play a more
active role in monitoring and enforcing norms of accountability.
I. Categorizing Abusive Online Conduct
A. Delineating the Boundaries of Online Abuses
1. Defining Online Abuses
“The Internet has turned reputation on its head. What was once private is
now public. What was once local is now global. What was once fleeting is now
permanent. And what was once trustworthy is now unreliable.” 18

Recent literature describes online abuse predominantly in terms of
cyberstalking, cyber harassment, and cyberbullying. None of these terms
has achieved a universally accepted definition, and there are significant
areas of overlap between them. Some authors have coined umbrella terms
such cyber victimization19 and cyber targeting20 to encompass all of these
17

See, for example, http://www.reputationdefender.com/, last viewed on April 14,
http://www.youdiligence.com,
last
viewed
on
May
20,
2010;
2010;
http://www.udiligence.com,
last
viewed
on
May
20,
2010;
http://www.reputationhawk.com, last viewed on June 6, 2010.
18
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 44.
19
Kate E Schwartz, Criminal Liability for Internet Culprits: The Need for Updated
State Laws Covering the Full Spectrum of Cyber Victimization, 87 WASH U L REV 407
(2009).
20
David A Myers, Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet: A Case
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categories of conduct. These commentators have avoided individual terms
for different cyber wrongs on the basis that overlaps between the classes of
wrong might “thwart clear analysis and the creation of successful
solutions”.21 There is some merit to the view that an umbrella term – such
as online abuses, cyber abuses or cyber wrongs - is more effective than
categorizing individual sub-classes of conduct, although there will be some
circumstances in which the individual classifications are important.22
Nevertheless, a brief consideration of the kinds of conduct described
in recent years as cyberbullying, cyber harassment and cyberstalking is
useful background. These terms are derived from their offline counterparts
– bullying, harassment, and stalking. As much current law, particularly
state criminal law, is focused specifically on bullying, harassment, and
stalking, it is necessary to understand the terms in order to appreciate the
gaps in the current legal system.
2. Cyberbullying
“Bullying is an attempt to raise oneself up by directly demeaning others; the
attacker hopes to improve his social status or self-esteem by putting others
down.”23

The term cyberbullying generally refers to online abuses involving
juveniles or students.24 While it is possible that in any given instance of
cyberbullying, at least one of the parties may not be a youth,25 discussions
Study of Cyber Targeting, 110 PENN ST L REV 667 (2006).
21
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 409.
22
For example, as the following discussion demonstrates, cyber-harassment laws
usually require a credible threat of immediate physical harm to a victim and thus are less
likely to be successfully challenged under the First Amendment because threats are
generally not protected speech: Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc v
American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. OR 1999) (threatening
speech not protected by the First Amendment). See also discussion in Cohen-Almagor,
supra note 3, at 5.
23
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 105.
24
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 410-411 (“the term cyberbullying is typically used in
reference to juveniles or students, but it is unclear exactly which party must be a minor for
the situation at issue to constitute cyberbullying. Some commentators consider
cyberbullying to be the internet counterpart to traditional playground bullying, which
presupposes that the culprit and the victim are both minors. For others, the term is used to
reference ‘the victimization of minors,’ regardless of whether the culprit is himself a minor
or an adult. A third definition for cyberbullying requires that the culprit be a minor, but
leaves open the possibility that the victim could be an adult, such as a teacher.”)
25
See, for example, Tokumatsu and Lloyd, supra note 8 (bully was mother of a
school mate of 13 year old victim of cyberbullying).

8

Combating Cyber-Victimization

[Draft: July 31, 2010]

about cyberbullying generally revolve around school-age children and often
call on schools to address the issue.26 The term bullying in the physical
world has tended to describe conduct that occurs “when someone takes
repeated action in order to control another person”.27 It can involve
tormenting, threatening, harassing, humiliating, embarrassing, or otherwise
targeting a victim.28
In recent years, the term has also been increasingly used in the
employment context to describe hostile or threatening conduct in the
workplace.29 In this context, bullying is differentiated from other offensive
conduct, such as harassment, on the basis that bullying tends to be targeted
at a particular person for reasons other than the person’s gender or race –
the typical focus of harassment laws.30 Targets of workplace bullying are

26

See, for example, Cal Education Code § 32261(d) (“It is the intent of the
Legislature in enacting this chapter to encourage school districts, county offices of
education, law enforcement agencies, and agencies serving youth to develop and
implement interagency strategies, in-service training programs, and
activities that will improve school attendance and reduce school crime and violence,
including vandalism, drug and alcohol abuse, gang membership, gang violence, hate
crimes, bullying, including bullying committed personally or by means of an electronic act,
teen relationship violence, and discrimination and harassment, including, but not limited to,
sexual harassment.”)(emphasis added); Andrew M Henderson, High-Tech Words Do Hurt:
A Modern Makeover Expands Missouri’s Harassment Law to Include Electronic
Communications, 74 MO. L REV 379, 381 (2009) (“ ‘Cyberbullying is when a child, preteen
or teen is tormented, threatened, harassed, humiliated, embarrassed or otherwise targeted
by another child, preteen or teen using the Internet, interactive and digital technologies, or
mobile phones.’ While typical cases of cyberbullying focus on young people, adults can
also be involved in such behavior.”); Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 6, at 410
(“parents and educators have an important responsibility to teach the young about cyber
harassment’s harms because the longer we trivialize cyber gender harassment, the more
difficult it will become to eradicate it.”)
27
Henderson, supra note 26, at 381.
28
id.
29
ABC News Story, Bullies in the Office: Bullying Worse than Sexual Harassment,
available at abcnews.go.com/index/playerindex?id=4527601 (last viewed on May 18,
2010); BullyOnline.Org, Bullying: What is It? (“Bullying is persistent unwelcome
behaviour, mostly using unwarranted or invalid criticism, nit-picking, fault-finding, also
exclusion, isolation, being singled out and treated differently, being shouted at, humiliated,
excessive monitoring, having verbal and written warnings imposed, and much more. In the
workplace, bullying usually focuses on distorted or fabricated allegations of
underperformance.”), available at http://www.bullyonline.org/workbully/bully.htm#Why,
last viewed on May 20, 2010).
30
Federal Communications Commission, Understanding Workplace Harassment,
available at http://www.fcc.gov/owd/understanding-harassment.html, last viewed on May
20, 2010 (noting that harassment occurs in cases of “unwelcome verbal or physical conduct
based on race, color, religion, sex (whether or not of a sexual nature and including samegender harassment and gender identity harassment), national origin, age (40 and over),
disability (mental or physical), sexual orientation…”).
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often perceived as a threat to the bully in some way.31 This notion of
bullying would cover the Megan Meier scenario where Lori Drew – the
perpetrator of the “Josh Evans” scam – perceived Meier as a potential threat
to her own daughter.32 She targeted Meier because of this perceived threat,
rather than because of Meier’s gender or race, attributes that would be
typically the subject of harassment law.
3. Cyber Harassment
Like harassment in the physical world, cyber harassment should
technically focus on targeting people by virtue of their membership in a
protected class: for example, race or gender.33 There is a fine line between
bullying and harassment, both online and offline. In cyberspace, as in the
offline world, the distinctions between bullying and harassment tend to blur.
Much conduct that has been described as cyber harassment involves
mobbing behavior aimed at silencing women and racial minorities.34 This
conduct seems to cross the line between bullying and harassment. While it
is directed at a protected class (women, racial minorities etc.), mobbing is
typical of bullying35 and the aim of driving subjugated groups offline seems
more about control than possession – again, typical characteristics of

31

BullyOnline.Org, supra note 29 (“Jealousy (of relationships and perceived
exclusion therefrom) and envy (of talents, abilities, circumstances or possessions) are
strong motivators of bullying.”)
32
Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 19 (noting that Lori Drew had suggested talking
to Megan Meier via the Internet to find out what Meier was saying online about Drew’s
daughter).
33
Federal Communications Commission, Understanding Workplace Harassment,
supra note 30.
34
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 64 (“[Noting] the growth of
anonymous online mobs that attack women, people of color, religious minorities, gays, and
lesbians. On social networking sites, blogs, and other Web 2.0 platforms, destructive
groups publish lies and doctored photographs of vulnerable individuals. They threaten rape
and other forms of physical violence. They post sensitive personal information for identity
thieves to use. They send damaging statements about victims to employers and manipulate
search engines to highlight those statements for business associates and clients to see. They
flood websites with violent sexual pictures and shut down blogs with denial-of-service
attacks. These assaults terrorize victims, destroy reputations, corrode privacy, and impair
victims' ability to participate in online and offline society as equals. Some victims respond
by shutting down their blogs and going offline. Others write under pseudonyms to conceal
their gender, a reminder of nineteenth-century women writers George Sand and George
Eliot. Victims who stop blogging or writing under their own names lose the chance to build
robust online reputations that could generate online and offline career opportunities.”)
35
BullyOnline.Org, supra note 29 (describing “gang” or “group” bullying, also
known as “mobbing”).
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bullying as opposed to harassment.36
Because of the overlaps between bullying and harassment and the fine
distinctions between them, it may be appropriate – at least in the early days
of online regulation – to address cyber-harms more universally and to worry
about the distinctions later. In fact, new distinctions may emerge that are
more appropriate in the digital age than some of the existing distinctions
between classes of conduct. For example, regulators may choose to
distinguish between communications specifically directed to an individual
and general communications about an individual on the basis that the
former conduct may be more immediately threatening or frightening to the
victim. If direct communications contain threats, such conduct may be
easier to regulate through legislation than general online communications
directed to an audience at large. Where an immediate threat of harm is
involved, speech is less likely to be protected by the First Amendment than
general speech directed to the world at large.37
4. Cyberstalking
Cyberstalking is a good example of conduct directed to a victim
rather than general communications about a victim. At least in some
jurisdictions, cyberstalking legislation requires a credible threat to the
victim.38 Some commentators have described cyberstalking as a direct
online analog to the offline crime of stalking. Cyberstalking may thus be
defined as: “the use of the Internet, email, or other means of electronic
communication to stalk or harass another individual”.39 Offline stalking has
typically been defined as involving: “repeated harassing or threatening
behavior”.40 The goal of the traditional stalker is to exert control over a
36

Erica Merritt, Workplace Bullying, presentation at Case Western Reserve
University, Cleveland OH, on May 18 ,2010 (session notes and PowerPoint slides on file
with the author).
37
See note 22, supra.
38
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 411 (“one commentator states that cyberstalking is
distinct from cyberbullying because cyberstalking involves credible threats”).
39
Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness
of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L REV 125, 126 (2007); see also Shonah
Jefferson and Richard Shafritz, A Survey of Cyberstalking Legislation, 32 U. WEST L.A. L
REV 323, 323 (2001) (“cyberstalking is not easy to define, and no universal definition is
accepted. One possible definition is ‘the use of the Internet, e-mail [sic] or other electronic
device to hound another person. It can involve ongoing harassment or threatening
behaviour.’ Query whether this definition really rises to the level of cyberstalking. Is
hounding enough?”)
40
Goodno, supra note 39, at 127 (“Generally, the goal of a stalker is to exert
‘control’ over the victim by instilling fear in her; and often such conduct leads to physical
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victim by instilling fear into her.41 In the physical world, as in cyberspace,
stalking can lead to actual physical harm.42
While cyberbullying and cyber harassment may damage an individual’s
reputation or livelihood, cyberstalking is more likely to result in severe and
immediate emotional or physical harm. Thus, at the very least, legislation
aimed at redressing cyberstalking may be able to stand up to First
Amendment scrutiny more easily than legislation aimed at other kinds of
online abuses.43 While the First Amendment may protect my ability to say
something unpleasant about you online – subject to defamation and privacy
law – it is much less likely to protect my ability to send you threatening
email messages.
B. Comparing Online and Offline Abuses
“[T]hanks to the power of the Internet, attackers and gossipmongers enjoy
instant global audiences and powerful anonymity.” 44

Laws targeted at real world activities often do not translate well to
cyberspace. Despite facial similarities between physical abuses and cyberabuses,45 there are significant underlying differences. Cyber-attackers can
utilize the Internet to harass their victims on a scale never before possible
both because of the immediate effect of their conduct and the global
dissemination of online information.46
This immediate and global
dissemination is inexpensive for the abuser and is not particularly timeconsuming.47 Online postings have a constant effect on the victim, as
opposed to more transient conduct in the physical world.48 Even where
action.”)
41

id.
id., at 128 (“cyberstalking involves repeated harassing or threatening behavior,
which is often a prelude to more serious behavior”); Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts,
supra note 7, at [14] (describing case in which online stalked led to murder of the victim by
the stalker).
43
See note 20, supra.
44
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 6.
45
Goodno, supra note 39, at 128 (“Some experts believe that cyberstalking is
synonymous with traditional offline stalking because of the similarities in content and
intent. Similarities that are pointed to include: a desire to exert control over the victim;
and, much like offline stalking, cyberstalking involves repeated harassing or threatening
behavior, which is often a prelude to more serious behavior.”)
46
id., at 128-9.
47
id.¸at 129.
48
id; Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [9] (“Emotional and
reputational harm are alive and well today. In many ways, however, they are far worse.
42
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information about a victim is removed from one website, it may be cached
and copied on other websites.49 Online communications have a permanent
quality that real world conduct lacks.50 Compounding the permanence
effect is the fact that online information is easily searchable through Google
and other popular search engines.51 Thus, damaging information is more
readily accessible to those who may be looking for it.
A cyber-attacker can also be physically removed from the victim.
He may be across the state, across the country or across the globe from the
victim.52 The unlimited reach of the Internet differentiates online abuse
from its offline counterparts in three important respects.53 First, online
abusers can act cheaply and easily from anywhere in the world.54 Second,
there is a sinister element in the secrecy of the attacker’s location. The
victim is constantly left wondering whether the attacker is in the next house
or far away. 55 Finally, the global reach of the Internet leads to jurisdictional
problems in enforcing laws against wrongdoers both in terms of law
enforcement and in terms of gathering evidence from multiple
jurisdictions.56
One might argue that online abuses are actually less serious than their
offline analogs because the victim has the option of simply turning off the
While public disclosures of the past were eventually forgotten, memory decay has largely
disappeared. Because search engines reproduce information cached online, people cannot
depend upon time’s passage to alleviate reputational and emotional damage.”)
49
id; Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 977 (“with projects such as the
Internet Archive, many images will continue to be available in some form even after all
‘live’ images have been removed from relevant websites.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra
note 1, at 54-55 (discussing the impact of the Internet Archive on the permanent quality of
online information).
50
id.
51
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 53-54 (“Conversations among friends
were once conducted in private; they left no permanent trace once the last echo faded, and
they could be spread only at the speed of interpersonal communication. Classroom notes
were passed and trashed or at worst intercepted by a teacher and read aloud before being
recycled. But many of those same conversations are now conducted online in a blog or
chat room, in full view of the world, automatically indexed by Google, and broadcast to an
audience of millions.”)
52
Goodno, supra note 39, at 129 (“Cyberstalkers can be physically far removed
from their victim.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 61-62 (“Online, it is often
impossible to know if the person you’re chatting with is half a block or half a world away.
The owner of a website might be your neighbor, or it might be someone in Azerbaijan.”)
53
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 129-130.
54
id., at 129.
55
id.
56
id., at 129-130.
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computer and walking away. However, in today’s interconnected world
that is not a viable option. People who are forced offline forego important
personal and professional opportunities.57 Also, a victim moving offline
herself does not stop others from posting harmful things about her that may
continue to harm her personal and professional development despite her
own choice not to read the postings. In many ways, it is better for a victim
to know what is being said about her so she can take steps to combat the
abuses. The question addressed in this article is how best to enable victims
to combat harms and protect their own reputations.
The anonymity of online abusers also distinguishes them from their
offline counterparts. While one might assume that online conduct is less
harmful than the offline equivalent because it does not involve immediate
physical contact, the opposite may be true.58 The anonymity provided by
the Internet may increase the volume of abusive conduct because it may
encourage individuals who would not engage in such conduct offline to do
so in the anonymous virtual forum provided by the Internet.59 People are
less inhibited when faced with a computer terminal than when faced with a
real live person.60 Cyberspace also enables perpetrators of online abuses to
57

Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 6, at 398 (“Although targeted women
close their blogs, disengage from online communities and assume pseudonyms, they incur
serious costs in doing so. Women miss opportunities to advance their professional
reputations through blogging. They cannot network effectively online if they assume
pseudonyms to deflect cyber abuse. They may lose advertising income upon closing their
websites or blogs. Unless women are willing to forgo the internet’s economic, social, and
political opportunities, they cannot walk away from our networked environment without
paying a high price.”); Mary Madden and Aaron Smith, Pew Internet & American Life
Project: Reputation Management and Social Media: How People Monitor Their Identity
and Search for Others Online (May 26, 2010), 3 (“12% of employed adults say they need to
market themselves online as part of their job.”)
58
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 130.
59
id.
60
id., at 130-131 (“The environment of cyberspace allows individuals to overcome
personal inhibitions.
The ability to send anonymous harassing or threatening
communications allows a perpetrator to overcome any hesitation, unwillingness, or
inabilities he may encounter when confronting a victim in person. Perpetrators may even
be encouraged to continue these acts.”); Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 10 (“The Internet
has a dis-inhibition effect. The freedom allows language one would dread to use in real
life, words one need not abide by, imagination that trumps conventional norms and
standards.”); Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 1383 (“Anonymity frees speakers from
inhibitions both good and bad. Anonymity makes public discussion more uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open than ever before, but it also opens the door to more trivial, abusive,
libelous, and fraudulent speech.”) ; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and Thomas Cotter, Authorship,
Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L REV 1537, 1575 (2007) (“Studies
show that even when an Internet user is not anonymous and knows the recipient of his email message, the speaker is more likely to be disinhibited when engaged in ‘computer
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spy on their victims in virtual space for extended periods of time without
ever being detected.61 And naturally anonymity makes it more difficult for
victims and law enforcement officers to identify and locate cyberwrongdoers.62
Another unique feature of cyberspace is that it enables perpetrators to
manipulate the victim’s identity online.63
Cyber-abusers can both
impersonate their victims and can manipulate others’ reactions to their
victims.64
Wrongdoers may engage in identity theft for financial
purposes.65 Additionally, they may pretend to be their victims, and send
inflammatory messages to online discussion groups or social networks in
the guise of the victim suggesting, for example, that the victim has fantasies
of being raped.66 Retaliation against the victim often follows. Retaliation
might include the victim being banned from certain websites, being
threatened by those who perceive her conduct as inappropriate, or being
propositioned by people who have been misled into thinking that she is
interested in engaging in unorthodox sexual activities.67
mediated communication’ than in other types of communications. The technology
separates the speaker from the immediate consequences of her speech, perhaps (falsely)
lulling her to believe that there will be no consequences. Since the Internet magnifies the
number of anonymous speakers, it also magnifies the likelihood of false and abusive
speech.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 76-78 (describing psychological studies
on disinhibition effects when perpetrators of harm are physically removed from their
victims).
61
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 131.
62
id.
63
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 78-79 (“[T]he anonymity provided by the
Internet allows attackers to easily impersonate others. On many sites, the lack of verifiable
identity allows malicious (or mischievous) users to enter somebody else’s name as their
own…. Attacks by impersonation can be particularly harmful: How do you prove that you
didn’t really make an offensive comment that appears to be posted under your name? How
do you show that it wasn’t really you who engaged in a juvenile spat online?”)
64
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 131-133.
65
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [12] (“Data leaks lead to
identity theft and fraud. Identity thieves use SSNs, biometric data, and insurance
information to empty bank accounts, take out credit cards, secure loans, and flip property.
They can destroy someone’s credit, precluding their ability to borrow money. Identity theft
can undermine individuals’ ability to obtain employment as employers access individuals’
credit reports in making hiring decisions. Some individuals can repair their credit reports
but only after spending on average over $5,720. Others, however, may lack the knowledge
and means to repair their credit reports. They may be unable to take out loans and get
insurance. They might even face financial ruin. Medical identity thieves leave individuals
with hefty hospital bills and someone else’s treatment records.”)
66
id., at [15-16] (describing cases where cyber-abusers have posted false “rape
fantasies” online in the names of targeted victims).
67
id.
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Thus, the conduct of a cyber-abuser may be differentiated from that of a
physical world wrongdoer in that the online abuser does not necessarily
communicate a direct threat to the victim. Instead, he can use general
online communications not specifically directed to his victim in order to
incite others to directly threaten or harm the victim. In many cases these
puppet actors used by the original attacker will not even be aware that their
activities are unwelcome or threatening in any way. This may occur where,
for example, a puppet believes that the victim harbors rape fantasies and
thinks he is merely playing out those fantasies rather than scaring or
harming the victim. For example, in several cases involving the popular
website Craigslist, bad actors posted messages giving personal details of
intended victims, including their home addresses, and saying that the
victims harbored rape fantasies.68 In at least one case, the intended victim
was actually raped by a third party who claimed he acted at the victim’s
invitation and that he was merely fulfilling what he thought was her rape
fantasy.69
It is very difficult for victims of these kinds of impersonation attacks to
effectively fight back in practice. Because identities are extremely difficult
to verify online, it can be almost impossible for a victim to establish that she
was not the person who posted the comments in question.70 It is very
difficult for the victim to prove a negative: that is, the “I didn’t do it” part of
the equation.71 Even if she can, the victim’s revocation may attract more
attention to the original content and ultimately make the damage worse.72
Additionally, even if the victim has a way of proving the negative, it may be
extremely difficult for her to connect with the appropriate audience for her
rebuttal of the perpetrator’s conduct. Many websites – like blogs – will
list comments in order of posting. Thus, a rebuttal by the victim may be
deprioritized at the end of a comment list where few readers are likely to see
it.73
As noted by the founder and the general counsel of
ReputationDefender, “many victims feel completely helpless when faced
with an anonymous impersonator”.74
68

id., at [15]
id.
70
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 79.
71
id.
72
id., at 144 (“Replying [to false-flag attacks] often draws more attention to the
original content, making the damage worse.”)
73
id (“And a repudiation [of a false flag comment] might never be seen: because
some websites list their comments in order by the date they were submitted, a late
repudiation may show up far down the page and thus be practically invisible.”)
74
id.
69
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II. Redressing Online Wrongs: Gaps in the Existing Legal
Framework
A. Criminal Law
1. Criminal Law versus Civil Law
Current criminal laws, including those targeted specifically at online
conduct, fail to comprehensively deal with today’s cyber-abuses. Existing
disharmonized state laws cannot effectively deter conduct that typically
crosses state or national borders. Criminal law shares with civil law the
shortcoming that victims are forced to relive the humiliation,
embarrassment, shame, and fear attached to the defendant’s conduct on the
public judicial record.75 Closed criminal trials may be preferable in
particularly sensitive cases.76 Absent effective privacy protections, victims
of online abuses may be reticent to make complaints or to give evidence in
court.
Unlike civil law, criminal law does not typically require a victim to
shoulder the costs of a laywer or the associated costs of litigation.
However, effective criminal law does require prosecutors and police to be
sufficiently well versed in the law and in the online conduct to make a
credible case against the abuser.77 The current lack of reliable data on the
prevalence of cyberstalking might be attributable to both the failure of
victims to bring complaints, and the lack of adequate training and funding
for police and prosecutors effectively to deal with online abuses.78
75

Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 961 (“Plaintiffs are put in the awkward
position of having to relive the humiliation and embarrassment of the images as they are
entered into the public record as part of the court proceedings.”)
76
Closed criminal trials raise constitutionality concerns and have been difficult to
achieve in practice in other contexts. See, for example Press Enterprise Co v Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (court reversed order sealing transcript of lower court
proceedings on First Amendment grounds).
77
Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 6, at 402-3 (“[Police officers] are
often either incapable of properly investigating harassment or unwilling to do so until it has
traveled offline. Officers often advise victims to ignore the cyber harassment until that
time.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 6 (“Law enforcement … lags behind the
Internet. In the United States, online law enforcement has generally been focused on major
fraud and child pornography. Many victims of ‘routine’ online attacks cannot obtain help
from the legal system, either because the attackers have disappeared into the digital night
or because local courts and lawyers simply don’t know how to deal with complex online
attacks that might have come from the far side of the world.”)
78
Goodno, supra note 39, at 156 (“The lack of data [about the prevalence of
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Despite its shortcomings, criminal law may be a better option than
civil law for redressing many online wrongs. Criminal law seeks to punish
and deter wrongdoing while civil law seeks to provide remedies that make a
plaintiff whole.79 Where the concern is with deterring and punishing
aberrant conduct, criminal law will be an important part of the regulatory
matrix. Because of their importance to the regulatory matrix, criminal laws
should be better harmonized and specifically targeted to today’s most
prevalent online abuses. The following examination of current state and
federal criminal laws identifies existing gaps in these laws in the online
context, and makes suggestions for law reform.
2. State Criminal Law
In recent years a number of states have enacted laws targeted
specifically at online conduct.80 However, most states still rely on preInternet legislation.81 Nebraska, for example, maintains stalking and
harassment legislation that does not expressly contemplate electronic
conduct. The Nebraska Revised Code states that: “Any person who
willfully harasses another person … with the intent to injure, terrify,
threaten, or intimidate commits the offense of stalking.”82 In this context,
“harassment” is defined as conduct: “directed at a specific person which
seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates the person and which serves no
legitimate purpose”.83 “Course of conduct” is defined as: “a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short,
evidencing a continuity of purpose, including a series of acts of following,
detaining, restraining the personal liberty of, or stalking the person or
telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the person”.84
This legislative approach fails to cover a number of prominent
cyberstalking] is partly because many cyberstalking victims do not report the conduct to
law enforcement, and partly because law enforcement agencies have not had adequate
training in how to deal with it.”)
79
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 427 (“cyber-victimization is better suited to
prosecution under criminal law, which seeks to punish and deter wrongdoing, than liability
under civil law, which seeks to make a person whole.”)
80
Carnley-Murrhee, Hot Air, supra note 6, at 18 (“In the void of federal legislation,
many states have enacted anti-cyberbullying laws. In the last decade, 19 states … have
enacted laws that prohibit cyberbullying with state boundaries…”).
81
id.
82
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.03 (2010).
83
id., § 28-311.02(2)(a) (2010).
84
id., § 28-311.02(2)(b) (2010).
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online abuses. Online conduct will not amount to “detaining” or
“restraining the personal liberty of” the victim. Online conduct may not
even comprise “following” a person if the term “following” is confined to
its traditional physical meaning. Stalking someone’s online activities may
not be the same as following a person in the physical world. Additionally,
the statutory definition of “course of conduct” contemplates that the
perpetrator must have directly targeted the victim. In its application to
communications technologies, the statute requires a direct communication
to the victim. This requirement does not fit the realities of cybervictimization. Much online harassment involves the perpetrator posting
online messages about the victim or even in the guise of the victim, rather
than communications directed to the victim.
New Jersey previously maintained a stalking law similar to
Nebraska’s law. However, the New Jersey statute was updated in 2009.
The current definition of “course of conduct” in New Jersey contemplates:
“repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical
proximity to a person; directly, indirectly, or
through third parties, by any action, method,
device, or means, following, monitoring, observing,
surveilling, threatening, or communicating to or
about, a person, …; repeatedly committing
harassment against a person; or repeatedly
conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or
written threats or threats conveyed by any other
means of communication or threats implied by
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or
toward a person.”85
Unlike Nebraska’s law, the New Jersey statute contemplates
activities utilizing any kind of device for monitoring, observing, surveilling,
threatening, or communicating to or about a victim. This is a better model
for legislation aimed at online conduct. It clearly covers electronic
communications devices as well as online conduct that involves posting
messages about a victim, rather than directed to the victim. Nevertheless, it
is unclear even under this model whether a perpetrator who disguises
himself as the victim and posts messages under the victim’s name would be
covered. Consider, for example, the scenario where a perpetrator uses the
victim’s identity to make online comments suggesting that the victim wants
85

N.J. Stat. 2C: 12-10(a)(1) (2010)
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to be raped and providing her personal contact details.86
It may be difficult for a prosecutor to convince a court that the
perpetrator here is effectively “communicating about a person” for the
purposes of the New Jersey statute. Where a perpetrator is pretending to be
another person, he is in a sense communicating about that person because
anything he does in the guise of the victim indirectly communicates his
views – be they true or false – about the victim. However, this conduct is
not the same as writing something about the victim in the third person. A
court might hold that the legislative intent of the statute was limited to
comments about the victim made by a person other than the victim, rather
than comments made in the guise of the victim.
Even if the New Jersey statute is broad enough to cover incitement
of third parties to harass the victim, many other state statutes – even
relatively recent statutes aimed directly at online conduct – are not as
broadly drafted as the New Jersey statute. For example, Florida’s relatively
new cyberstalking legislation defines cyberstalking as engaging: “in a
course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words,
images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional
distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.”87 Under this
provision, there seems to be little doubt that a perpetrator posing as a victim
online would not be communicating information directed at a specific
person.88 Thus, while the New Jersey statute may cover these kinds of
scenarios, the Floridian statute will not extend this far. The differences in
drafting between the criminal laws in different states also cause significant
disharmonization concerns where abusive online conduct crosses state
borders.
3. Federal Criminal Law
a. Interstate Communications Act
One solution to the problem of disharmonized state law would be
86

Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [15-16].
Fla. Stat. § 748.048(1)(d) (2009).
88
See also Goodno, supra note 39, at 145 (“Although [the] group of state laws
which overtly deal with cyberstalking is clearly a step in the right direction, these statutes
have gaps …. Few of them explicitly address situations where the cyberstalker dupes an
‘innocent’ third party to harass.”); 146 (“As of March 2007, only three states, Ohio, Rhode
Island, and Washington, have statutes that explicitly address cases where third parties
innocently harass the victim at the cyberstalker’s bidding.”)
87
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greater focus on federal criminal legislation. Unfortunately, the current
federal legislation contains many gaps and inconsistencies when applied to
online abuses.89 The federal laws that are most relevant to online wrongs
are mainly found in those sections of the United States Code that deal with
electronic communications and computer systems.
The Interstate
Communications Act, for example, provides that: “Whoever transmits in
interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”90
This provision has limited application to online abuses because of its
requirement of a threat of physical injury. 91 Many online abuses do not
contain overt physical threats. In fact, many abusive communications are
not specifically directed at their targets, but rather are comments about their
targeted victims on generally accessible websites. 92 The Interstate
Communications Act will also not cover situations where a perpetrator
poses as a victim online to incite third parties to harass or harm the victim.
b. Telephone Harassment Act
The federal Telephone Harassment Act may have some application
to online abuses. As amended in 2006, the statute prohibits a person from
making a telephone call or utilizing a communications device without
disclosing his identity and “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass
any person at the called number or who receives the communications”.93
The revisions to the statute were intended to capture harassing email
messages.94 While the provision will cover some cyberspace abuses,
particularly the sending of threatening or harassing emails, it has significant
limitations. For one thing, it is limited to acts “in interstate or foreign
communications,”95 although this may not be a very significant hurdle in
practice.
Courts may hold that any activities involving global
communications devices – such as the Internet - occur in interstate or
foreign communications.
More importantly, the statute will not cover situations where an
Internet communication is not directed towards a particular recipient. The
89

Carnley-Murrhee, Hot Air, supra note 6, at 18 (describing federal legislation in
the cyberbullying area as being a “void”).
90
18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
91
Goodno, supra note 39, at 147-148.
92
id.
93
47 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)(1)(C).
94
Goodno, supra note 39, at 148-9.
95
27 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)(1).
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requirement that the victim must be the recipient of a specific
communication will not cover situations where a perpetrator simply posts
information about the victim on a website, or where he poses as the
victim.96 Another limitation of the statute is that it carves out situations
where the perpetrator has not remained anonymous.97 In order for the
prohibition to apply, the perpetrator must have failed to disclose his
identity.98 In cases where a victim knows the identity of the harasser, the
statute will not apply.
c. Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act
Another recently amended federal statute that may apply to online
abuses is the Federal Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act
(FISPPA). This statute prohibits harassment and intimidation in “interstate
or foreign commerce”99 and now specifically extends to conduct that
involves using “the mail, any interactive computer service, or any facility of
interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that causes
substantial emotional distress”. As with the Telephone Harassment Act, the
extent to which the “interstate or foreign commerce” requirement will limit
the potential application of the FISPPA is unclear.
However, the FISPPA improves on the Telephone Harassment Act
to the extent that it does not require a communication to be specifically
directed to a victim. The FISPPA focuses instead on conduct that utilizes
an interactive computer service to create a state of emotional distress in the
victim, regardless of whether any communications posted on the computer
service were specifically directed to the victim as a recipient.100 Unlike the
96

Goodno, supra note 39, at 150 (“[The Telephone Harassment Statute] applies only
to direct communications between the stalker and victim, e.g., the statute would only be
triggered when the cyberstalker sends an e-mail [sic] directly to the victim. Thus, the
amended statute is inadequate to deal with behavior where the cyberstalker indirectly
harasses or terrorizes his victim by posting messages on a bulletin board, creating a
Website aimed at terrorizing his victim, or encouraging third parties to harass the victim.”)
97
id. (“It seems odd to only make cyberstalking a crime where the identity of the
cyberstalker is unknown. This element seemingly, and without reason, carves out a
number of terrifying cases where the victim knows the identity of the cyberstalker.”)
98
Lidsky and Cotter, supra note 60, at 1590 (raising constitutional concerns about
the validity of this statute on First Amendment grounds because the statute fails to protect
constitutionally protected values inherent in the defendant’s anonymity).
99
18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2261A(1), 2261A(2).
100
Goodno, supra note 39, at 152 (“[T]he newly amended § 2261A addresses many
of the shortcomings of the other federal statutes. It does not have a ‘true/credible threat’
requirement; but rather adopts a standard that measures the victim’s ‘reasonable fear’ or
‘substantial emotional distress.’ ”)
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Telephone Harassment Act, the FISPPA will apply where the defendant is
not anonymous.101 Like the other federal legislation described above, the
FISPPA does not expressly deal with situations where the perpetrator of the
online abuse poses as the victim online.

d. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
One other federal criminal law that may be relevant to online abuse
is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).102 This legislation was
originally aimed at unauthorized hacking into computer systems and was
not focused on personal attacks. However, prosecutors in the Megan
Meier/Lori Drew case utilized the CFAA creatively to bring criminal
proceedings against Drew, who had perpetrated a cyberbullying attack
resulting in the suicide of thirteen year old Meier. 103 Drew was the mother
of a classmate of Meier and knew that Meier struggled with depression. On
the popular social networking site, MySpace, Drew posed as a sixteen year
old boy named Josh Evans who started a friendship with Meier and later
sent her insulting and harassing messages, concluding with a message that
the world would be better off without her.104 Evans never really existed.
He was a fictional creation of Drew, who had developed the Evans persona
to find out whether Meier would say anything negative about Drew’s
daughter online.105
Drew’s conduct was not a criminal act under local Missouri law.106
However, federal prosecutors charged Drew with unauthorized access to a
computer under the CFAA. They utilized the criminal trespass provisions
of the statute arguing that Drew had infringed MySpace’s terms of service
by failing to provide accurate registration information, engaging in abusive
conduct, and harassing other people.107 During the initial trial, a jury found
that Drew had infringed provisions of the CFAA relating to making
101

id. (“[The FISPPA does not] limit coverage of the ‘use’ of the computer to only
anonymous e-mail [sic] messages.”)
102
18 U.S.C. § 1030.
103
Henderson, supra note 26, at 393 (“Despite her egregious actions, Missouri
officials were unable to charge Lori Drew with a crime. However, after creatively
interpreting the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, federal officials charged her with
conspiracy and unauthorized access of a computer.”); Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at
1386 (describing the legal action in the Lori Drew case).
104
Henderson, supra note 26, at 379.
105
id., at 379-380.
106
id., at 380.
107
id., at 393.
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unauthorized access to, or exceeding authorized access to, a computer.108
However, on appeal, a motion by Drew to acquit and overturn the
misdemeanor conviction was upheld.109 The court found that the CFAA
would be void for vagueness if it imposed criminal liability on anyone who
infringed a website’s posted terms of service.110 Thus, Drew’s misuse of
the MySpace website could not result in criminal liability under the CFAA.
e. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prvention Bill
In the wake of the Meier incident, federal legislation was proposed
that would be more clearly directed at cyberbullying than any existing
federal laws. The Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Bill111 was
introduced in 2008 but never enacted. If it had been implemented, it would
have prohibited transmitting a communication “with the intent to coerce,
intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person” and
“using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile
behavior”.112 The definitions of “communication” and “electronic means”
in the bill were fairly broad and, if enacted, would have encompassed
modern Web 2.0 technologies such as blogs and online social networks.113
While this legislation would have been broad enough to cover much
abusive online conduct, it is arguably overbroad for a variety of reasons.
108

United States v Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 453 (2009) (“The [trial] jury did find
Defendant ‘guilty’ ‘of [on the dates specified in the Indictment] accessing a computer
involved in interstate or foreign communication without authorization or in excess of
authorization to obtain information in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(A), a misdemeanor.’”)
109
United States v Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (2009).
110
id., at 464 (“The pivotal issue herein is whether basing a CFAA misdemeanor
violation as per 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C) and 1030(c)(2)(A) upon the conscious
violation of a website's terms of service runs afoul of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. This
Court concludes that it does primarily because of the absence of minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement, but also because of actual notice deficiencies. ….[T]erms of
service which are incorporated into a browsewrap or clickwrap agreement can, like any
other type of contract, define the limits of authorized access as to a website and its
concomitant computer/server(s). However, the question is whether individuals of ‘common
intelligence’ are on notice that a breach of a terms of service contract can become a crime
under the CFAA. Arguably, they are not.”); 467 (“In sum, if any conscious breach of a
website's terms of service is held to be sufficient by itself to constitute intentionally
accessing a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization, the result will be
that section 1030(a)(2)(C) becomes a law that affords too much discretion to the police and
too little notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet].’”)
111
H.R. 6123, 110th Cong. (2008).
112
id. at § 3(a).
113
id., at § 3(a).
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For one thing, it is not confined to a repeated course of conduct and so
could inadvertently catch one-time situations where people have acted
uncharacteristically out of anger in the heat of the moment.114 Additionally,
while aimed at the Meier incident and drafted with a view to protecting
minors,115 the text of the statute is not expressly limited to conduct
involving minors. As a result, the bill may be unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds because it may inadvertently sanction constitutionally
protected expression amongst adults.116
In the wake of the Meier incident, the Missouri legislature updated
the state harassment law to ensure that online bullying would be covered.
As now drafted, the Missouri anti-harassment law provides that:
“A person commits the crime of harassment if he or she:
….
(3) Knowingly frightens, intimidates, or causes emotional distress
to another person by anonymously making a telephone call or any
electronic
communication;
or
(4) Knowingly communicates with another person who is, or who
purports to be, seventeen years of age or younger and in so doing
and without good cause recklessly frightens, intimidates, or causes
emotional
distress
to
such
other
person;
or
…
(6) Without good cause engages in any other act with the
purpose to frighten, intimidate, or cause emotional distress to
114

ROBERT SUTTON, THE NO ASSHOLE RULE: BUILDING A CIVILIZED WORKPLACE
SURVIVING ONE THAT ISN’T, 11 (2007) (“Psychologists make the distinction between
states (fleeting feelings, thoughts, and actions) and traits (enduring personality
characteristics) by looking for consistency across places and times…”).
115
H.R. 6123, 110th Cong., § 2 (2008) (contemplating that the purpose of the bill is to
protect children aged from 2 to 17 years old).
116
In the past, legislatures have had difficulty establishing that laws abridging online
speech are sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive First Amendment scrutiny. See, for
example, Reno v American Civil Liberties Union, 521 I.S. 844 (1997) (holding that a
statute attempting to restrict minors’ access to harmful material was unconstitutional under
the First Amendment); Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004)
(holding that a statute that imposed criminal penalties for posting content harmful to
minors on the Internet was unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
AND
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another person, cause such person to be frightened, intimidated, or
emotionally distressed, and such person's response to the act is one
of a person of average sensibilities considering the age of such
person.”117
This statute is a good model for legislating against abusive online
conduct. It covers multiple communications media, including the Internet.
It also focuses on the victim’s state of mind. While several of the subsections require the victim to actually be the recipient of the harasser’s
communications,118 the final sub-section does not require a communication
directed to the victim.119 Thus, it could cover a situation where the harasser
poses as the victim online and incites third parties to harass the victim. That
sub-section also includes a reasonableness requirement with respect to the
victim’s response. For liability to attach, the victim’s response should be
appropriate to a person of “average sensibilities considering the age” of the
victim.
One problematic aspect of the statute is that it is not limited to
situations in which the harasser engages in a repetitive pattern of abusive
conduct towards the victim. Thus, it might catch a one-time situation where
a perpetrator acts out of character in the heat of the moment.120 This may be
a factor that courts should consider in applying the statute, even though the
express words of the statute do not require the courts to identify a pattern of
abusive conduct. Additionally, there is no express “legitimate expression”
defense. Courts applying the statute may thus need to consider, in any
given case, whether the defendant’s speech should be protected on
constitutional grounds.
4. Drafting Effective Criminal Legislation
Criminal laws focused on online abuses need to deal with a number
of issues that many state and federal laws are currently lacking. The laws
need to remove requirements of proximity to the victim, and requirements
of a credible threat of physical harm in order to be effective in
cyberspace.121 Legislators may want to retain some laws with a credible
117

Missouri Ann. Stat. § 565.090(1) R.S. Mo. (2009).
id, § 565.090(1)(3) & (4).
119
id., § 565.090(1)(6).
120
SUTTON, supra note 114, at 11.
121
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 429 (“none of the crimes should require an element of
proximity to the victim, nor should they include an ‘overt’ or ‘credible’ threat
requirement”); Goodno, supra note 39, at 136 (“In cyberstalking cases, a statute with a
credible threat requirement does not protect against electronic communications (such as
118
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threat requirement because such laws may be less open to First Amendment
challenge than laws of more general application. However, where
legislators have focused on credible threat provisions, resulting laws will
have to be supplemented with other regulatory approaches that remedy
situations where there is no direct and immediate threat to a victim.122
Cyber-abuse laws might also usefully include a requirement of
repetitive conduct to avoid catching situations where a person feeling
unconstrained by the online medium acts in a one-time capacity without any
ongoing intent to threaten or harass another.123 Of course, some of these
one-time communications can lead to permanent and lasting damage
because of the global and permanent nature of online information
disclosures.124 Legislators will need to strike a careful balance to ensure
that trivial comments are not sanctioned while more damaging one-time
activities can be appropriately deterred.
There may be a number of ways to achieve this balance. For
instance, judges could be asked to focus on the substance of the online
communication in terms of whether the statements made by the perpetrator
are likely to cause minor annoyance or major harm to the victim. A
comment that someone is “not a nice person” is less egregious than a
comment that someone is a “slut” or that she “wants to be raped”.
Legislation could be drafted to give judges discretion to punish one-time
thousands of e-mail [sic] messages) that are harassing, but do not include an actual
threat.”); 138 (“A second problem with a credible threat requirement in cyberstalking cases
is an issue of receipt. A ‘threat’ suggests a communication directly from the stalker to the
victim. But a cyberstalker can easily post terrifying messages without ever being in direct
contact with the victim or without the victim ever personally receiving the message…. A
third problem that the credible threat requirement creates in cyberstalking case is that it
requires the victim to prove that the cyberstalker had the ‘apparent ability’ to carry out
whatever he threatens. What if the cyberstalker sends a threatening e-mail [sic] to the
vicim from across the country? It would seem that the victim might then have the burden
to prove that the cyberstalker had the financial ability to buy a plane ticket to travel across
the country to carry-out [sic] that threat. Such a requirement is onerous and unnecessary,
particularly since the victim may not even know the true identity or location of the
cyberstalker.”).
122
See discussion in Part III, infra.
123
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 430 (“the applicable actus reus [for cybervictimization crimes] should include a requirement of repetitive conduct. It is important
that repetition be incorporated for all of the crimes because ‘punishing merely one instance
of harassing conduct may unjustly penalize one who acts once out of anger, verses one who
engages in a series of terrifying acts”.); SUTTON, supra note 114, at 11.
124
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [9] (describing permanence
of information posted online); Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 977 (describing
use of Internet archives to maintain permanent records of information posted online)
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offenders in cases where their online communications are particularly
egregious. Another approach would be for legislation to require that the
proscribed conduct should generally be of a repetitive nature, while not
expressly preventing a judge from sanctioning stand-alone communications
in appropriate cases.
Legislation aimed at online abuses should also maintain the mens
rea requirements that currently exist in state legislation. For example, the
Nebraska statute described in Part II.A.2 requires willful conduct on the part
of the perpetrator.125 This may go some way towards mitigating any
perceived harshness inherent in allowing judges to sanction one-time
abuses. Judges might utilize the mens rea requirement to distinguish
activities that rise to the level of criminal conduct from those resulting from
a brief burst of anger.
Effective legislation should not require a communication to be sent
directly to the victim.126 Web technologies including blogs, online social
networks, wikis, and other online discussion forums are extremely popular.
However, they generally do not involve communications sent directly to
another. Rather, communications are posted for the whole world to see, or,
in a closed network, for a particular community to see, such as a community
of “Facebook friends”.127 Communications sent directly to another might
merit special attention, particularly if they involve direct and credible
threats of harm. However, direct threats are not the sum total of today’s
damaging online conduct.
Any attempt to legislate against online abuses must be sensitive to
First Amendment concerns. Legislation aimed at prohibiting immediate
and credible threats is less likely to be unconstitutional than legislation of
broader application. In the cases of broader legislation, the First
Amendment might be accommodated by ensuring that the legislation
specifies that the speech in question is not constitutionally protected.128
125

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.03 (2010) (“ Any person who willfully harasses another
person or a family or household member of such person with the intent to injure, terrify,
threaten, or intimidate commits the offense of stalking.”)
126
Goodno, supra note 39, at 146 (noting problems with current anti-cyberstalking
statutes in Louisiana and North Carolina in that those statutes require harassing
communications be sent ‘to another’).
127
Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 939 (describing the concept of
Facebook “friends”).
128
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 431-432; see Fla. Stat. § 784.048(1)(b) (2009)
(“‘Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally
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While it may be difficult to perfectly accommodate the First Amendment,
free speech concerns should not be used as an argument against protecting
victims. In the physical world, statutes have successfully criminalized
offline analogs to many of today’s online wrongs.129 There is no reason
why judges cannot continue to draw lines between protected and prohibited
speech in the online context.
Another factor that might usefully be incorporated into future
legislation would be the concept of a reasonable person standard relating to
the victim’s state of mind.130 If criminal liability only arises when a victim
reasonably fears for his or her safety, this may protect expression that could
not reasonably be regarded as creating fear or emotional distress in the
victim’s mind. Thus, unpleasant but predominantly harmless online gossip
would be protected, but speech that involves, say, egregious damage to a
victim’s reputation would be sanctioned. The Missouri anti-harassment
legislation passed in the wake of the Megan Meier incident is a good
example of the incorporation of a concept of the victim’s reasonable
response to the perpetrator’s actions.131 While reasonable person standards
can be difficult to apply in practice, they do give the courts some flexibility
in deciding which conduct to sanction and which conduct should be
excused.
B. Tort Law
1. Online Abuses: Common Challenges for Tort Law
Cyberspace interactions pose challenges for tort law, including
defamation,132 privacy torts,133 and intentional infliction of emotional
protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ Such
constitutionally protected activity includes picketing or other organized protests.”); Fla.
Stat. § 748.048(1)(d) (2009) (“’Cyberstalk’ means to engage in a course of conduct to
communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through
the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person,
causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.”)
129
See, for example, statutes discussed in Part II.A.2, supra.
130
Goodno, supra note 39, at 139-140 (“Those stalking statutes that have a
reasonable person standard provide the most successful way to prosecute cyberstalking ….
The reasonable person standard does not require that the cyberstalker send an explicit
threat to the victim, nor does it require that the victim prove the cyberstalker had the ability
to carry it out. Instead, the standard focuses on the victim and whether it is reasonable for
her to fear for her safety because of the cyberstalker’s conduct.”)
131
Missouri Ann. Stat. § 565.090(1) R.S. Mo. (2009); see discussion in Part II.A.3,
supra.
132
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 87 (“Targeted individuals [of online
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distress.134 The common challenges to all of these torts include the ease
with which a perpetrator can hide his identity by utilizing a pseudonym and
anonymizing technologies, making it difficult to locate and identify him.135
While it is possible to unmask anonymous actors online,136 often much
damage has been done by the time the actor is identified.137 Unmasking a
perpetrator of an online abuse may require a court order. This can be
expensive and time consuming, outside the budget of many victims of
cyber-abuses.138
Another practical problem raised by anonymous and pseudonymous
online communications is the fact that some plaintiffs may use tort law to
unmask the author of defamatory comments not with a view to proceeding
abuses] could … pursue general tort claims, such as defamation. False statements and
distorted pictures that disgrace plaintiffs or injure their careers constitute defamation per se,
for which special damages need not be proven.”); Lyrissa Lidsky, Silencing Jon Doe:
Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L J 855 (2000) (expressing concerns
that defamation suits will be the obvious actions to combat online abuses and will
potentially stifle online discourse); Kara Carnley-Murrhee, Sticks & Stones: When Online
Anonymous Speech Turns Ugly, UF LAW, 21, 22 (Winter 2010) (citing Lyrissa Lidsky
describing the ease of bringing defamation actions for objectionable speech online)
[hereinafter, Sticks and Stones]
133
Carnley-Murrhee, Hot Air, supra note 7, at 19 (citing Scott Bauries noting that tort
actions for invasion of privacy might be a useful approach to cyberbullying)
134
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 87-88 (“Many victims [of online
abuses] may have actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress. That tort responds
to ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ by a defendant who intended to cause, or recklessly
caused, the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress …. Various types of online harassment
have supported emotional distress claims, including threats of violence, the publication of a
victim’s sensitive information, and disparaging racial remarks.”); Lyrissa Lidsky,
Comments on Blog Posting: New Cyberbullying Case: D.C. v R.R., March 19, 2010,
available at http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/03/new-cyberbullying-casedc-v-rr.html#comments, last viewed on March 22, 2010 (noting that intentional infliction
of emotional distress is relevant to new cyberbullying case).
135
For
example,
the
TOR
anonymizing
software:
See
http://www.torproject.org/overview.html.en#thesolution, last viewed on April 14, 2010
(“Individuals use Tor to keep websites from tracking them …”); see also FERTIK and
THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 71 (discussion of anonymizing technologies, including TOR).
136
Some examples of “unmasking” litigation: Columbia Ins Co v SeesCandy.Com,
185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (attempt to identify anonymous domain name
cybersquatter); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000)
(attempt to unmask anonymous online defendants); In re Verizon Internet Services, 257 F.
Supp 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003) (attempt to unmask anonymous online copyright infringers
under subpoena provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 512).
137
For example, in the Megan Meier case, the victim had already committed suicide
by the time Lori Drew’s actions were investigated: See discussion in Part II.A.3, supra.
138
Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 1387 (noting that many victims of online
defamation, for example, lack the resources to bring suit).
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with the litigation, but rather with the intention of taking matters into their
own hands. Thus, instead of the judicial system working to compensate the
victim for the harm she suffered, it creates a platform for her to engage in a
campaign of vigilante justice against the defendant. Even in situations
where the victim herself does not intend to use the defendant’s identity to
retaliate, the unmasking could lead to others engaging in online attacks
against the defendant.
Basically, any legal action used to identify anonymous speakers runs
the practical risk of creating a backlash against the speaker, regardless of
whether the speaker might have a valid defense to a tort action. Whether or
not the action goes forward, both the plaintiff and the defendant face a
potential barrage of new online attacks as a result of the public nature of the
lawsuit.139 Many of the extra-legal approaches to protecting online
reputations discussed in Part III do not involve publicity of the original
abusive incident and thus avoid the potential for retaliatory attacks against
those involved in the original incident. Any tort-based litigation will also
involve time and costs that an individual victim may not be in a position to
bear.140 Along with these burdens, a victim would have to relive the shame
and humiliation of the abuse in the public record during the proceedings.141
139

Bartow, supra note 14, at 386-7 (“The targeted law students [in the AutoAdmit
case] were apparently initially ridiculed on AutoAdmit by people they knew in real space,
as evidenced by personal information that was disclosed, such as the style or color of
clothing they wore at a particular location. But once the women were contextually framed
as people who deserved to be mocked and punished (mostly because they objected to the ill
treatment [by commencing litigation]) online strangers mobbed and besieged them as
well.”); 399 (“[W]hen women complain about harassment, it often escalates. The
AutoAdmit administrators seemed to intentionally create a climate the encouraged angry,
widespread flaming of anyone who complained about the way they were treated by posters
at the AutoAdmit boards. This intensified the harassment, which in turn led to the filing of
the lawsuit. Subsequently, seemingly everywhere in cyberspace that the AutoAdmit
lawsuit was discussed where anonymous commenting was allowed, attacks on the two
women [who were victims of the online abuse] followed.”)
140
id; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 90 (noting that many plaintiffs in
the cyber-harassment context cannot afford the high costs of litigation); Schwartz, supra
note 19, at 427 (“Furthermore, even if there is an applicable cause of action, the simple
well-known fact that ‘civil lawsuits are expensive’ will often prevent injured parties from
bringing suit based on limited resources. As part of her story about being targeted by an
internet stalker, Cynthia Armistead states: ‘Legal advisors have since told me that there
was more than enough evidence to obtain a civil judgment, but I did not have the resources
to pursue a civil case ... when the case was "fresh".’ Armistead's perspective, as someone
who has directly faced internet abuse, highlights the fact that costs and difficulties of
maneuvering and understanding the legal system present hurdles that would impede many
victims from pursuing civil redress.”)
141
Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 961 (Noting that plaintiffs are put in
the awkward position of having to relive the humiliation and embarrassment of the images
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While attempting to punish the wrongdoer, the victim would effectively be
drawing more attention to the harmful conduct.
Victims of online abuses also face jurisdictional hurdles. Even in
cases where the victim knows, or is able to ascertain, the identity of the
perpetrator, that party may be in another jurisdiction. Courts in the victim’s
place of residence may not be able to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants. The costs to the victim of establishing jurisdiction over the
defendant, often coupled with the costs of identifying the defendant in the
first place,142 may be prohibitive. Even in cases where the victim is able to
identify and assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the
enforcement of an award for damages or an injunction may be another
matter. In many cases it will be impossible or impracticable to enforce a
judgment against a remote or impecunious defendant.
Another general limitation of tort law is the difficulty associated
with attaching liability to parties who provide forums for posting damaging
content. These parties are generally immune from liability for the speech of
others under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA).143 Section
230 immunizes providers and users of “interactive computer services” from
liability for information “provided by another information content
provider”.144 In other words, where an entity has provided a forum for
online speech, that entity shall not be held liable for tortious speech of
others who may use the forum for harmful purposes.145
Section 230 presents challenges for victims of online abuse both
because it immunizes the most obvious party against whom an injunction
could be enforced and because it has been very broadly interpreted by the

as they are entered into the public record as part of the court proceedings.); Lidsky, supra
note 8, at 1390 (“suing often brings more attention to libelous statements”).
142
Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 1385 (noting uncertain state of law applying to
the unmasking of anonymous defendants, which would also add to the costs of unmasking
defendants in interstate cases).
143
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated s the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”)
144
id.
145
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [39] (“Website operators
will enjoy immunity from tort liability under section 230(c)(1) of the Communications
Decency Act …. Section 230 generally frees online service providers from liability related
to the postings of others.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 6 (“A legal loophole
in the Communications Decency Act makes it impossible to force a website to remove
anonymous attacks, no matter how false and damaging they may be.”)
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courts.146 Online service providers are the most effective points in the chain
of communications for victims to pursue. They provide the gateways for
online discourse. Victims of online abuses can easily identify them. They
generally have the financial resources to compensate victims by way of
damages and, more importantly, they usually have the technical capacity to
remove abusive postings and block abusive posters.
However, under § 230, courts have immunized online service
providers from defamation and associated liability for extremely egregious
conduct, including comments posted by those with whom the ISP may have
a close contractual relationship.147 Further, the near-absolute immunity148
of online service providers under § 230 has had the practical effect of
preventing courts from engaging in meaningful discussions of the standard
of care that might be expected of these service providers absent the statutory
immunity.149 While § 230 immunizes intermediaries and disincentivizes
them from monitoring online postings, a victim may effectively have no
legal remedy at all in cases where an anonymous poster cannot be found.
There will be no action available against the intermediary and no way of
bringing an action against the original poster of the abusive content.150
2. Defamation
146

Zeran v America Online, 129 F. 3d 327 (4th Cir 1997) (immunizing Internet
service provider from false and defamatory comments posted by others even in
circumstances where it had knowledge of the postings and had not acted swiftly to remove
them, because of a broad application of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act);
Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that America Online was not
liable for comments posted by a commentator it had contracted with to make sensationalist
comments on its services because of the application of § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act).
147
Blumenthal v Drudge, supra note 132.
148
Internet service provider has not been absolute as a result of the application of §
230 of the Communications Decency Act. In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando
Valley v Roommates.com, 521 F. 3d 1157 (9th Cir, 2008), an online service provider was
held liable for information that it had created in part. See also Citron, Mainstreaming
Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [39] (“Section 230 generally frees online service providers
from liability related to the postings of others. This safe harbor is inapplicable, however, if
the website operator helps create the content enabling the criminal activity. The antiabortion group running the Nuremberg Files site exemplifies a party with no immunity
under section 230.”)
149
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 116-117 (“[The] efforts to read a
sweeping immunity into § 230 despite its language and purpose have prevented the courts
from exploring what standard of care ought to apply to ISPs and website operators.”)
150
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 65 (“[W]hen the original author cannot
be found, the website’s refusal to act leaves the victim without any remedy: the false
content stays online, forever staining the victim’s reputation.”)
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Defamation law only protects victims against false statements that
may harm their reputations.151 Many online statements are true, even if
unpleasant or embarrassing. Many are also statements of opinion which are
not typically actionable.152 Even where the comments are true, the victim in
bringing an action puts the defendant to proof on the public record of the
truth of the comments. In many cases this could be very awkward for the
plaintiff. For example, a defendant may be required to prove that a plaintiff
is, in fact, a “slut”. Even bringing evidence of more innocuous things, like
proof that the plaintiff was overweight, could be highly embarrassing to the
plaintiff.
Despite these practical limitations, defamation law – like all laws
impacting social conduct - serves an important expressive function that
helps to guide conduct between individuals online.153 Thus, even the
possibility of a small volume of online defamation actions may serve a
larger regulatory purpose in terms of expressing social values more broadly.
If we remain aware of the limitations of defamation as an enforcement
mechanism, we might nevertheless accept its important expressive
functions.
151

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 558(a) (requiring a “false and defamatory
statement” as an element of a defamation action); § 559 (“A communication is defamatory
if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”).
152
id., at § 566 (“A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the
form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.”);Lidsky, John Doe,
supra note 8, at 1382 (“A statement can only be defamatory if it asserts or implies
objective facts about the plaintiff; otherwise, it will be deemed constitutionally protected
opinion.”)
153
Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 1390 (noting that a defamation action can
serve the function of creating a fear of being unmasked in other potential defendants, and
thus can impact online behaviors with respect to parties outside the litigation process);
NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX, 104-105 (2008) (“[L]aw often serves an
expressive or symbolic function above and beyond regulating or providing incentives for
conduct. Antidiscrimination law, for example, may have symbolic importance beyond
whatever discriminatory conduct it actually proscribes. In enacting and applying such law,
Congress and the courts effectively express our society’s official condemnation of
discrimination based on race and various other classifications. Similarly, the law might
forbid certain market transactions, such as selling body parts or children for adoption, not
merely to avoid harmful consequences that might ensue but to make a statement about
human dignity. Laws that protect endangered species, forbid hate speech, and require
recycling also have important symbolic dimensions over and above their regulation of
conduct per se. Such laws give vent to and help crystallize collective understandings and
norms. In turn, by giving legal imprimatur to certain values, they shape future perceptions
and choices.”)
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3. Privacy Torts
The American privacy torts were developed at a time well before the
age of electronic communications technologies.154 The laws are focused
largely on reasonable expectations of privacy drawn from paradigms
involving physical space.155 One may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy behind a locked door but may not have such an expectation in a
public street. In the electronic sphere, these expectations break down. Is a
Facebook page more like a public forum or a private space? While a
Facebook user may exert some control over who accesses her profile, surely
more people will access that profile than her private house. An individual
Facebook user may not know her Facebook “friends” as well as she knows
people she invites into her own home. It is not clear how much privacy she
actually expects from her online relationships.
Although different states vary on privacy protections, most maintain
some variations on the four privacy torts identified by Dean Prosser in
1960.156 These torts are: (a) intrusion into seclusion;157 (b) public
disclosure of private facts;158 (c) false light publicity;159 and, (d) commercial
misappropriation of name or likeness.160 None of these torts is an obvious
154

Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [3] (“Privacy tort law is a
product of prior centuries’ hazards. In the late nineteenth century, snap cameras and
recording devices provided a cheap way to capture others’ private moments without
detection. The penny press profited from the publication of revealing photographs and
gossip about people’s personal lives.”)
155
Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21
HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 2 (2007) (“[P]rivacy is usually a
function of the physical space in which the purportedly private activity occurred.”); 3
(“Traditionally, privacy has been inextricably linked to physical space.”)
156
Dean Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL L REV 383 (1960).
157
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B (“One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”)
158
id., § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is
not of legitimate concern to the public.”)
159
id, § 652E(“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.”)
160
id., § 652C (“One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness
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match for the kinds of conduct examined in this article.
Unpleasant comments about another, whether directed to that other, or
directed to a general audience, will generally not be an intrusion into
another’s seclusion. The intrusion tort is based on notions of intrusion into
a person’s private physical space, rather than intrusions into a person’s
mental state.161 The intrusion tort would generally cover cases where
someone has entered another’s private domain without invitation. It would
be difficult to apply the concept to unpleasant comments made in online
forums.162
While some commentators have argued that it would not be much of
a stretch for courts to extend the tort to conduct like hacking people’s
password protected email accounts,163 there is as yet no judicial authority on
point.164 Another potential limitation of the intrusion tort, even if it were
extended to online conduct, is that it would likely only apply to intrusions
into the plaintiff’s own private online spaces, such as the plaintiff’s email
account or Facebook page. It would be difficult to argue that the plaintiff
could make out an intrusion claim where the defendant had simply
published unpleasant information about her online without specifically
impacting on any area of the plaintiff’s own “online space”.
The public disclosure of private facts tort is also problematic. This
tort deals with the publication of private and non-newsworthy information
disclosure of which would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person”.165
This tort may apply to some online abuses, but it is not clear where the line
would be drawn in terms of identifying sufficiently offensive information.
Courts have generally set the bar relatively high and have imposed a

of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”)
161
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [25] (“Plaintiffs cannot
bring intrusion into seclusion claims because online postings do not involve invasions of a
place that the plaintiff understands as private.”)
162
id.
163
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 88 (“Online mobs could face intrusion
claims for hacking into password protected e-mail accounts containing private
correspondence and conducting denial-of-service attacks to shut down personal blogs and
websites.”)
164
In fact, Professor Citron cites a case of an intrusion claim involving a creditor
making intrusive phone calls as an example of the extension of the tort away from activities
by the defendant that involve the defendant’s physical presence in the plaintiff’s personal
space: Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 88, n. 4 (citing Donnel v Lara, 703 S.W.
2d 257, 260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)).
165
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 87.
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significant burden on plaintiffs to prove offense.166 While some online
communications may meet this test, others will not. For example,
photographs of an individual in a sexually explicit and compromising
situation may be highly offensive, while comments that a person is fat or
slutty, or simply the posting of generally unflattering photographs with
unpleasant commentary may not be sufficiently offensive.
False light publicity is also problematic online.167 It might be
regarded as the little brother of defamation law in the sense that it
proscribes publication of information that is not, strictly speaking, false, but
that may present an individual in a false light. Litigants will be forced to
argue on the public record about the truth or falsity of unpleasant comments
and the extent to which recipients of the information formed a false
impression of the plaintiff. As with the public disclosure tort, the false light
publicity tort – when coupled with the other disadvantages of litigation – is
only a limited answer to online abuse.
It is unlikely that the misappropriation tort would apply to much
online harassment because this tort requires the defendant to have made an
unauthorized commercial profit from the plaintiff’s name or likeness.168
Most online abuse is non-commercial. It is possible that a plaintiff might
bring an appropriation action against that the operator of a web service that
made money from encouraging personally hostile discourse. For example,
a service like AutoAdmit or Juicy Campus169 – if it adopted a commercial
model based on advertising or membership fees and then facilitated abusive
online discussions - might be said to be making a commercial profit from
another’s name or likeness. However, a court may require that the
defendant itself be the person who appropriated the plaintiff’s name or
likeness. Where the defendant has rather provided a forum for others to
166

Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 932 (“The [public disclosure] tort also
generally requires that the private facts in question must have been shameful by an
objective standard which is often difficult to prove.”); Jonathan B Mintz, The Remains of
Privacy’s Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MARYLAND LAW
REVIEW 425, 439 (1996) (“Whether a fact is private by nature - that is, whether a
reasonable person would feel seriously aggrieved by its disclosure - is the subject of some
disagreement.”)
167
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [25] (“False light claims
require proof of plaintiff’s placement in a false light. They do not apply when … leaked
information causes mischief because it is true.”)
168
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C (“One who appropriates to his own use or
benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy.”)
169
Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 11-14 (discussing moral responsibility of
services like Juicy Campus for harmful postings by their members).
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appropriate names and likenesses for abusive discourse and has profited
from providing that forum, a court may hold that the elements of the tort are
not satisfied.170 In any event, § 230 of the CDA would immunize most
providers of these forums from any such liability.
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort may be more
promising than the other torts. This tort requires a finding of extreme or
outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant that caused, or was
intended to cause, severe emotional distress.171 Some courts have been
willing to find for plaintiffs where a defendant exploits a power disparity
between the parties or otherwise takes advantage of a vulnerable plaintiff.172
It may be easier to convince a court of such a power disparity or
vulnerability in online abuse cases than to focus on the content of the
communication, which is generally necessary in defamation and some of the
privacy torts.173
While it is difficult to determine by contemporary social standards what
might satisfy the extreme or outrageous conduct limb of the tort, many
cases of cyberbullying and cyber harassment will have powerful emotional
effects on their victims. For example, a recent situation involving the
“Casual Encounters” board on Craigslist resulted in a teenager being
inundated with pornographic messages and confronted by men at her place
of work as a result of an online posting that she had rape fantasies and
enjoyed pornography.174 Even though the perpetrator’s conduct involved
merely posting a message on Craigslist, his action – coupled with the
substance of the message and the harmful results – may amount to extreme
or outrageous conduct. Although the intentional infliction of emotional
distress action may theoretically be a promising avenue for individuals
harmed by cyber abuses, this tort still suffers from the same practical
limitations as the other torts in terms of time, cost, jurisdictional challenges,
170

But see Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [35-43] (suggesting
the development of an action for tortuous enablement of criminal or tortuous conduct by
website operators).
171
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 87-8; Restatement (Second) of Torts §
46(1)(1965).
172
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 88 (“Courts are more willing to
consider conduct ‘outrageous’ if the defendant exploited an existing power disparity
between the parties or knowingly took advantage of a vulnerable plaintiff”).
173
For example, defamation actions and false light publicity claims focus, at least in
part, on the content of the communications made by the defendant about the plaintiff.
174
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [15].

38

Combating Cyber-Victimization

[Draft: July 31, 2010]

and potential increased public humiliation for either or both parties.
C. Civil Rights Law
Professor Citron has recently suggested that a civil rights agenda
might be developed to combat certain cyber abuses.175 Civil rights laws
include doctrines against race discrimination that might interfere with a
victim’s ability to make a living and laws that criminalize threats of force
designed to intimidate or interfere with a person’s employment based on
that person’s race, religion or national origin.176 In other words, civil rights
law addresses the kinds of conduct typically described as harassment in the
sense that victims are targeted because of their membership in a particular
protected class.177 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
gender discrimination as a result of intimidation, threats or coercion aimed
at interfering with employment opportunities.178 While this law focuses on
employment opportunities, many online abuses aimed at women and
minorities do prevent members of those groups from engaging in
employment or “making a living” because many people’s businesses are
now conducted wholly or partly online.179
Civil rights suits entail some advantages including easing the costs
of litigation for victims of online harassment,180 as well as reaching wrongs
175

Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 89 (“A meaningful response to abusive
online mobs would include the enforcement of existing civil rights laws …”)
176
id., at 91-92 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 18 U.S.C. §245(b)(2)(C) respectively).
177
See discussion in Part I.A.3, supra.
178
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 92 (“Gender discrimination that
interferes with a person’s ability to make a living can be pursued under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which sanctions those who intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or
attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce someone with the purpose of interfering with
employment opportunities due to their gender.”)
179
id. (“Destructive online crowds intimidate women and members of racial and
religious minorities, preventing them from ‘making a living’ due to discriminatory animus.
Because the Internet fuses our public and private lives and is a workplace for many, online
attacks on vulnerable individuals often interfere with their equal right to pursue work. For
instance, women who stop blogging in the face of an online mob’s attack lose advertising
revenue and opportunities for advancement….Online mobs also conduct denial-of-service
attacks to shut down blogs that generate income for women and racial minorities. They
spread damaging statements to employers and professors for whom victims may work in
order to interfere with their employment opportunities.”); Madden and Smith, supra note
57, at 3 (noting that 12% of employed adults now report that they need to promote
themselves online).
180
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 92 (“[C]ivil rights laws have attractive
remedial features. Because damages may be hard to prove and quantify, and because many
plaintiffs cannot afford to litigate based on principle alone, the high cost of litigation often
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that would otherwise escape criminal or tort liability.181 However, while
Citron’s suggested civil rights agenda is well reasoned it remains untried.
Adopting a broader civil rights agenda aimed at online abuses would
confront many of the same problems as extending tort and criminal law to
cover online abuses. Enforcing authorities, including judges and, in some
cases the United States Attorney General,182 would have to be willing to act
against online abusers. These authorities may be reticent to do so absent a
clearer mandate. Additionally, civil rights laws, along with tort and
criminal law, raise problems of identifying often anonymous defendants.
Civil rights law, if applied online, might help some groups targeted
by online abusers, such as women, and racial and religious minorities.
However, other sets of common victims, such as children, are unlikely to be
covered here unless an individual victim also happens to fall into a
statutorily protected class. In other words, civil rights law might provide
some protections against cyber-harassment, but not necessarily against
cyberbullying. As noted above, cyberbullies generally target individuals for
reasons outside membership in a protected class.183 Bullies may target
people who they perceive as a threat, or who they regard as weak –
potentially including people who are poor, inarticulate, overweight, or
socially inept. None of these traits would fall within the umbrella of civil
rights protection.
III. Extra-Legal Approaches to Online Wrongs
A. The Need for a Multi-Modal Approach
Because of the limitations inherent in the legal system, a broader multimodal regulatory approach is necessary to combat online abuses. The idea
of combining regulatory modalities in cyberspace is not new.184 However,
deters the filing of general torts suits. The awards of attorney’s fees possible under many
civil rights statutes might make some cases affordable to pursue.”)
181
id. (“[C]ivil rights suits may reach wrongs that would otherwise escape liability.
These include victims’ rights to be free from economic intimidation and cyber harassment
based on race and gender.”)
182
id. (noting that the Attorney General can file civil suits for injunctive relief under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
183
See discussion in Part I.A.2, supra.
184
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV
L REV 501 (1999) (suggesting four regulatory modalities for cyberspace: legal rules, social
norms, market forces, and system architecture); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of
Privacy, 1 VANDERBILT J ENT L & PRAC 56, 62-3 (1999) (suggesting the same four norms
of regulation for online privacy); Lipton, We the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 925 (“This
Article argues that legal regulation alone is unlikely to solve society’s video privacy
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web 2.0 technologies increase the need for a complex interplay of
regulatory approaches in order to identify, and facilitate the development of,
appropriate online behaviors.185 Relevant regulatory modalities will likely
include social norms,186 system architecture,187 market forces,188 public
education,189 and the use of private institutions.190
In global online communities laws must interact with other
regulatory modalities to achieve a comprehensive approach to combating
abuses. Legislators and judges will learn much from observing the
development of market solutions,191 technological solutions and emerging
problems. It advocates a multi-modal approach that combines six regulatory modalities:
legal rules, social norms, system architecture, market forces, public education, and
private/non-profit institutions.”).
185
See, for example, LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 (full text available at
http://pdf.codev2.cc/Lessig-Codev2.pdf, last viewed on April 20, 2010), at 5 (“Cyberspace
demands a new understanding of how regulation works. It compels us to look beyond the
traditional lawyer’s scope—beyond laws, or even norms. It requires a broader account of
‘regulation,’ and most importantly, the recognition of a newly salient regulator. That
regulator is the obscurity in this book’s title—Code.”) [hereinafter, CODE].
186
Katherine Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of
Willpower Norms, 57 RUTGERS L REV 1235,1238 (2005) (“Social norms are primarily
understood as means to coordinate the behavior of individuals in a social group. Thus,
norms may help to solve coordination problems – by determining how pedestrians pass one
another on the street - and collective action problems – by stigmatizing littering - when
individually rational behavior leads to collectively undesirable results.”); Jacqueline
Lipton, Copyright’s Twilight Zone: Digital Copyright Lessons from the Vampire
Blogosphere, forthcoming MARYLAND LAW REVIEW, 2010 (discussing the development of
norms of authorship and fan use of copyright works online); Jacqueline Lipton, What
Blogging Might Teach About Cybernorms, forthcoming AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
JOURNAL, 2010 (discussing the development and identification of norms in the
blogosphere); Steven Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix
Culture, 157 PENN. L. REV. 1869 (2009) (discussing the role of norms in regulating online
fan fiction and remix communities); Mark Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll:
What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21
BERKELEY TECH L J 651 (2006) (discussing the role of norms in regulating copyrights in
certain sectors of the music industry).
187
LESSIG, CODE, supra note 185, at 5; Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The
Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEXAS L REV 553
(1998) (describing how digital technology can be utilized as a form of regulatory
mechanism for online conduct).
188
Ann Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF L REV 1231, 1253 (2001) (“Markets
constrain behavior through price. If the price of gasoline rises dramatically, people will
drive less.”)
189
Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at Part IV.E.
190
id., at Part IV.F.
191
For example, reputationdefender.com, last viewed on May 20, 2010;
youdiligence.com, last viewed on May 20, 2010; udiligence.com, last viewed on May 20,
2010 (examples of private online reputation management services).
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social norms192 that impact online behavior. Participants in online
communities will also learn something from a legislature’s willingness to
legislate to proscribe certain conduct. Public education, both through news
stories and other means – such as publicly or privately funded education
initiatives – are also an important part of the framework. Appropriately
tailored educational initiatives will assist in the development of online
norms.
This Part examines several extra-legal regulatory approaches that
could impact ways in which people interact online. It focuses on regulatory
modalities that can empower victims to control their own reputations
online. It also suggests ways in which public and private funding might be
usefully funneled into educational initiatives to assist individuals in
preventing online harms, abuse reporting hotlines, and programs that
facilitate relevant industry self-regulation. One advantage of focusing on
extra-legal initiatives is that their development is less likely to be hindered
by concerns about the First Amendment than legal developments. This is
because private actors such as reputation management services and private
education providers are not generally subject to First Amendment
guarantees.193
B. Empowering Victims to Combat Online Abuses
1. Reputation Management Techniques
“Your online reputation is your reputation. Period.” 194

A key to protecting individuals from online abuses is to empower those
individuals to protect themselves without needing to resort to the legal
system. There are a variety of ways in which individuals can guard their
own reputations online. Some methods involve learning to control
information that an individual releases about herself on the Internet – such
as personal anecdotes and photographs. Educating individuals about the
risks of disclosing private information online is an important aspect of
protecting online reputation. For example, individuals can be encouraged

192

See, for example, ownwhatyouthink.com, last viewed on May 20, 2010 (campaign
to promote more accountable and responsible online discourse).
193
Constitution of the United States, Amendment I (“Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”)
194
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 16.
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to use maximum privacy protections on services like Facebook195 and to
ensure that they have sufficient security measures installed on their personal
computers to prevent others from accessing their personal information.
Individuals can also be trained to build positive online content about
themselves as a form of online insurance to prevent negative content from
making it into the first page of search results about them.
Better educating people about the risks inherent in releasing their
personal information online is unquestionably important. However, bigger
problems occur when the individual’s friends or acquaintances disseminate
the harmful information. While a potential victim may secure her own
computer and may be careful about what she discloses about herself online,
she has very little control over what others disclose about her. She also has
very little control over attacks directed specifically to her.
Individuals now have to be vigilant not only about what they
disclose about themselves online, but also in monitoring what others may
be disclosing about them.196 Individuals may also need to be aware of
currently available ways to combat damaging content about them. This
may involve learning how to conduct a personal reputation audit197 and
asking providers of online forums to monitor, police, and remove damaging
content.198 It may also involve knowing how to use other online tools, such
as astroturfing and search engine optimization to repair damage.199
Astroturfing involves seeding the Internet with positive or neutral
content generated by the individual herself in an attempt to drown out the
abusive content.200 Search engine optimization techniques involve the
195

In fact, Facebook has recently simplified its privacy settings to better enable its
users to make use of its privacy-protecting technologies: Mark Zuckerberg, Making
Control Simple, THE FACEBOOK BLOG, May 26, 2010 (available at
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=391922327130, last viewed on June 7, 2010).
196
Robert McGarvey, Is Bad Taste the New Taste? Social Media is Changing Our
Sense of What’s Acceptable – and What’s Not, THINK 25, 26-27 (Spring/Summer, 2010)
(describing situation where an Ohio executive found out that an old friend had posted
online a photo of him in a drunken stupor from his youth, and the steps he attempted to
take to have the photo de-tagged from social networking websites); Madden and Smith,
supra note 57, at 2-3 (noting that individuals are indeed becoming more vigilant over time
about self-monitoring and observation of information available about others online).
197
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at Chapter 10.
198
Bartow, supra note 14, at 415 (noting that some people who run online forums do
a lot of policing on their own initiative).
199
id., at 426-7.
200
id. (describing the use of astroturfing by reputation management services such as
ReputationDefender). The term “astroturfing” has arguably begun to take on negative
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manipulation of search engine results so that positive or neutral information
is prioritized in searches above harmful information.201 Many of these tools
are currently utilized by private online reputation management services, but
there is no reason individuals cannot not learn how to use them without
needing to pay the fees charged by the private services.202 Some literature
is now available to assist individuals to learn strategies that commercial
reputation management services have typically utilized.203
Another mechanism for protecting some aspects of an individual’s
online reputation is available under the notice-and-takedown provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).204 These provisions allow
a copyright holder to send a notice to a website operator requesting removal
of material that infringes a copyright. If the operator complies with the
notice, it can avoid copyright infringement liability.205 The effectiveness of
this technique in the hands of a private individual will depend on the extent
to which the individual actually holds copyright in damaging text and
images about her. In many cases, such materials will have been generated
by third parties.206 Thus, the victim will not have a copyright claim that
could support the use of the DMCA.207
The ability of an individual to make use of any of the techniques
described here will depend on her awareness of the techniques. One of the
problems for victims of online abuses has been lack of awareness of how to
protect one’s own reputation online, outside of resorting to the law or
connotations in the sense that some people may now associate it with conduct like seeding
the Internet with false political information. However, in the absence of a better term,
“astroturfing” is utilized in this paper in reference to seeding any type of positive or neutral
information about an individual in an attempt to protect her reputation online.
201
Bartow, supra note 14, at 427 (describing use of search engine optimization
techniques by private reputation management services).
202
id., at 421 (“It is doubtful that any reputation defense service offers clients
anything that they cannot do for themselves if they have a basic understanding of
applicable laws, of the way that search engines function, and of the vulnerability of search
engines to targeted manipulation.”)
203
For example the founder and general counsel of ReputationDefender have
released a book detailing some strategies for individuals to protect their own online
reputations: FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1.
204
17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
205
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
206
For example, a person who takes an embarrassing photograph of the victim will
generally hold copyright in the photograph:
DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF
REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET, 184 (2007) (“Copyright in
a photo is owned initially by the person who takes the photo, not by the person whose
photo is taken.”)
207
id.
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engaging the services of a private reputation management company. While
private reputation management services unquestionably have a useful place
in protecting people’s online reputations, they are motivated by profits and
they can charge high fees208 for doing a number of things that private
individuals could do on their own if they knew how.209 Cynically, one
might also argue that private reputation management services actually
benefit from online abuses and it is in their own commercial interests that
online abuses continue to some extent.210
2. Education
The increased ability of private individuals to utilize effective
methods to protect their own reputations online might put more pressure on
private reputation management services to develop new products and
services, or to price their services more competitively. The question
remains how best to empower private individuals to protect their
reputations online. Clearly, some level of public education would be
useful. Education might be government funded and targeted at schools and
other public institutions211 – like libraries and universities. It may also be
that private non-profit organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier
Foundation212 and the Electronic Privacy Information Center,213 will play
an increasingly important role. Education can focus both on empowering
victims to protect their reputations against online attacks and on training
participants in online communities to behave in a socially acceptable
manner more generally.
208

Bartow, supra note 14, at 423-426 (describing fees charged by
ReputationDefender for its various services).
209
id., at 421 (“It is doubtful that any reputation defense service offers clients
anything that they cannot do for themselves if they have a basic understanding of
applicable laws, of the way that search engines function, and of the vulnerability of search
engines to targeted manipulation.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, Chapters 10-13
(describing ways in which private individuals and small businesses can act to protect their
own online reputations).
210
Bartow, supra note 14, at 419 (“[T]he greater the quantity of sexual harassment
toward affluent victims that appears on the Internet, the wealthier reputation defense
services can become.”). Of course, one could make similar arguments about the home
security system industry. This industry unquestionably profits from home burglaries.
However, that is not to say that they condone the conduct of burglars.
211
While government regulation of speech generally raises First Amendment
concerns, the government is generally able to attach speech-restrictive provisions to
funding legislation without running afoul of the First Amendment: United States v
American Library Associaton Inc, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding legislation that required
Internet filtering as a condition of libraries accepting government funding).
212
See www.eff.org, last viewed on April 20, 2010.
213
See www.epic.org, last viewed on April 20, 2010.
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A number of private organizations already provide information
about online harms as well as providing tools for addressing them. Many of
these organizations focus on protecting children from online predators and
bullies.
For example, NetSmartz provides information to parents,
guardians, educators, law enforcement authorities and children about
staying safe on the Internet.214 NetSmartz also offers free multimedia
safety presentations that can be used in classrooms and other communities.
Its website also links to the Internet Crimes Against Children website,215 a
government sponsored educational initiative to protect children online.
Another service aimed at protecting children online is
GetNetWise,216 which provides information, advice and free online tools
for keeping children safe online. It contains an inventory of suggested
software tools parents might utilize to protect their children as well as
critiques of the available software options. It also provides a suggested
contract that parents can enter into with their children containing guidelines
to help children stay safe in their online interactions.217
C. A Critique of Existing Commercial Reputation Management
Services
While an increasing number of services provide free information and
tools for combating online abuses, some of the most well known services
are the for-profit reputation management services like ReputationDefender,
Reputation Hawk, and YouDiligence. Private reputation management
services raise some practical concerns, despite the useful function they
serve. As noted in the previous section, reputation management services
offer a variety of options for protecting individual reputations online. They
will monitor an individual’s online reputation218 typically for a monthly
fee.219 They then provide monthly reports to a client summarizing
information about the client available online.220
214

See www.netsmartz.org, last viewed on May 20, 2010.
See www.icactraining.org, last viewed on May 20, 2010.
216
See http://kids.getnetwise.org, last viewed on May 20, 2010.
217
See http://kids.getnetwise.org/tools/toolscontracts, last viewed on July 8, 2010.
218
Focusing on popular services like MySpace and Facebook: See Bartow, supra
note 14, at 424 (“ReputationDefender claims it will monitor blogs and sites like MySpace,
Facebook, Xenga, Bebo, Flickr, LiveJournal, and many others for any material that might
be damaging or distressing to a client …”)
219
id., at 424 (“The SEARCH part of [ReputationDefender’s] service requires
payment of a subscription fee, which costs $14.95 per month, with discounts to people who
sign up for one or more years at a time.”). YouDiligence currently charges between $9.99
215
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If the service detects information that the client objects to, the
service will offer to remove the damaging content from the Internet at a
charge relating to each piece of information the client wants to destroy.221
The information does not have to be untrue to be targeted by the service at
the client’s request.222 However, many reputation management services
now focus on the removal of slanderous or damaging information, and
refrain from removing much information that is true or newsworthy.223
Most reputation management services regard their techniques for sanitizing
a person’s online reputation as “proprietary”224 and do not disclose those
techniques publicly.225 However, their methods likely include: (a) using
notice and takedown procedures from the DMCA;226 (b) contacting blogs

and $14.99 per month for its monitoring services: see www.youdiligence.com, last viewed
on May 20, 2010.
220
Bartow, supra note 14, at 423 (citing ReputationDefender’s “SEARCH” process).
221
id., at 424 (“The DESTROY aspect of the enterprise costs $ 29.95 per piece of
unwanted information, with no guarantee of positive or sustainable results.”)
222
id. (noting that ReputationDefender does not require information to be inaccurate,
harassing or defamatory in order to remove it; and that the service is prepared “to sanitize
any inconvenient truths”); at 425 (“ReputationDefender is also willing to mask or bury
accounts of mainstream news stories even if they are true.”)
223
ReputationDefender,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
available
at
http://www.reputationdefender.com/faq/, last viewed on July 8, 2010 (“Our removal
(‘Destroy’) service is designed to help individuals regain control over unintentionally
posted or outdated personal information disclosed to the public Internet, and address
potentially libelous, slanderous, defamatory or invasive information about them We do not
target news/media articles for removal. Nor do we seek to get government records removed
from the Internet. We believe that individuals have the right to express ideas freely, and we
support the freedom of the press to inquire fully about issues of legitimate public interest.
Given that, we reserve the right to refuse any requests that we believe conflict with these
fundamental values. But we also believe that it is the right of individuals to know what
others are saying about them, and for private individuals to protect themselves from
unintentional, inappropriate, or illegal intrusions of their privacy.”)
224
Bartow, supra note 14, at 421 (noting ReputationDefender’s reference to its
techniques as being “proprietary”).
225
id., at 425 (“ReputationDefender refuses to disclose the exact nature of its socalled destruction tools, and presumably its competitors do as well.”). More recently,
ReputationDefender has disclosed a number of its reputation management techniques:
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1.
226
Bartow, supra note 14, at 421 (discussing use of the notice and take-down
provisions of copyright law by online reputation management services); see also discussion
in Part III.B, supra. In an interview with David Thompson, general counsel of
ReputationDefender, he stated that ReputationDefender does not actually use the notice and
take-down provisions of copyright law in practice (interview with David Thompson at the
3rd Annual Privacy Law Scholars’ Conference, George Washington Law School,
Washington, D.C., June 3, 2010).
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and other web hosts and asking them to remove damaging information;227
(c) astroturfing the Internet with newly manufactured neutral or positive
information about their clients;228 and, (d) engaging in search engine
optimization techniques to ensure that neutral and positive information
about their clients is prioritized in search results.229
These services provide a number of advantages over legal solutions
to online abuses, including the fact that several of them now have many
years of experience with reputation management and have established solid
working relationships with websites that host harmful communications.230
The use of private commercial services does not raise the specter of a First
Amendment challenge. As noted in Part II, many laws directed at curtailing
online speech may raise First Amendment concerns and may be open to
constitutional challenge.231 Reputation management services also avoid
many of the practical problems associated with litigation including
jurisdictional challenges and difficulties identifying a defendant in the first
place. A commercial service does not need to identify or locate a potential
defendant in order to engage in astroturfing or search engine optimization.
Resort to a reputation management service also avoids drawing public
attention to the damaging content.232 Harmful content can simply be
unobtrusively de-prioritized in search engine results.
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Bartow, supra note 14, at 425 (“In addition to utilizing the notice and take-down
procedures of copyright law, another of ReputationDefender’s vaunted proprietary
techniques is apparently to send e-mails to blogs and websites hosting information that its
clients want to disappear.”)
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id., at 426-427 (“[Astroturf] is Internet content that springs from artificial grass
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geographically distributed, independently acting individuals. Reputation defense services
may be seeding the world wide web with astroturfing websites and blogs of their own
creations to create a faux chorus of noise that drowns out speakers that their clients wish
would ‘sod off,’ whether for socially good reasons, or for bad.”)
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id., at 427 (“Another avenue open to reputation defense organizations is Search
Engine Optimizing, which has been characterized by at least one legal scholar as fraud. It
is an effort to manipulate search engine results for profit.”); Lidsky, John Doe, supra note
8, at 1390 (describing services provided by commercial reputation management
companies).
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FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 206 (“Professionals have built thousands
of websites and know exactly how to optimize them to rank the highest in Google and other
search engines. They often know the right tone to strike and the right balance of links to
create. And professionals often have an arsenal of deals with specialized websites that
allow rapid improvement in search results.”)
231
See, for example, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There A Right to Have
Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L REV 297, 348-9
(2004).
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Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 1390 (“Hiring a reputation management
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However, reliance by individuals on these commercial services has
a number of disadvantages, despite the obvious benefits. One of the key
disadvantages relates to cost and equity issues. Many of the victims of
online harassment and other abuses will not be able to afford the fees
charged by these services.233 While engaging a service to monitor one’s
reputation on the Internet may be relatively affordable,234 paying fees to
repair one’s online reputation may be prohibitive for many. Additionally,
while these commercial services are available – at least to some more
wealthy people – there may be less pressure on the government to act. If
the government thinks the market is handling the problem, government
agencies may put less effort into investigating and prosecuting the
abuses.235
The apparent availability of reputation management services may
also negatively impact the level of monitoring undertaken by those who
provide online speech forums. These forum providers are generally
immunized from tort liability for the speech of others under § 230 of the
CDA.236 This legislation is a powerful disincentive for online service
providers to monitor and act against harmful speech. The perceived
availability of reputation management services may further disincentivize
online forum providers from monitoring their own forums. Service
providers might assume that they need not monitor their forums because not
only are they generally immune from legal liability for the speech of their
contributors, but also if there is a problem, they will receive a notice from a
reputation management service. Better yet, the reputation management
service may simply take care of the problem through astroturfing or search
engine optimization without requiring any action on the part of the online

company sometimes provides an attractive alternative to suing for libel because suing often
brings more attention to the libelous statements.”)
233
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 105 (“Few free or inexpensive services
are available for defending one’s online reputation, and the services of groups like
ReputationDefender are expensive and beyond the means of many victims.”)
234
As noted above, the fees for monitoring one’s reputation are typically in the
ballpark of around $10 to $15 a month: Bartow, supra note 14, at 424 (noting that
ReputationDefender charges $14.95 per month to monitor a client’s online reputation).
235
id., at 422 (“While it appears that self-help options are available, momentum for
official intervention can dissipate. Government actors may decline to assist online
harassment victims because the more affluent ones can theoretically purchase assistance
from ReputationDefender or similar services. They may not see a need to step in and have
the government provide assistance that could readily be purchased, at least by those who
can afford it.”)
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See discussion in Part II.B.1, supra.
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service provider.237 Recent statistics suggest that many online service
providers will quickly remove harmful information on request.238
However, it is difficult to gauge how proactive any of these services are in
removing damaging information absent a formal request to do so.
Another practical limitation of reputation management services is
that the actions they take to protect their clients’ reputations may backfire
dramatically. Most of them will not offer any guarantees of success239 or
refunds for backlash caused by their activities.240
For example,
ReputationDefender client, Ronnie Segev, suffered a significant backlash as
a result of ReputationDefender’s efforts to remove embarrassing content
about him from a website.241 After ReputationDefender sent a notice to the
website operator requesting removal of the harmful information,242 a

237

See discussion in Part III.B, supra.
Madden and Smith, supra note 57, at 4 (noting that a significant majority of
people who have sought removal of information about them posted online have been
successful).
239
The disclaimer in YouDiligence’s terms of service is a good example of how little
these services guarantee in practice. See YouDiligence.com, Terms of Service, January 5,
2010, clause 14, available at www.youdiligence.com/yd/TermsOfUse.htm, last viewed on
May 20, 2010 (“You agree that use of the YouDiligence site and the service is entirely at
your own risk. The YouDiligence site and the service are provided on an ‘as is’ or ‘as
available’ basis, without any warranties of any kind. All express and implied warranties,
including, without limitation, the warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular
purpose, and non-infringement of proprietary rights are expressly disclaimed to the fullest
extent permitted by law. YouDiligence disclaims any warranties for the security,
reliability, timeliness, accuracy, and performance of the YouDiligence site and the service.
To the fullest extent permissible by law, YouDiligence disclaims any warranties for other
services on the YouDiligence site or the sites or service, or accessed through any links on
the YouDiligence site. To the fullest extent permitted by law, YouDiligence disclaims any
warranties for viruses or other harmful components in connection with the YouDiligence
site or the service.”)
240
Bartow, supra note 14, at 424 (noting that reputation management services do not
give guarantees of positive or sustainable results); Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5,
at 105 (“[I]nstead of slowing down an online mob, counter-measures may sustain the life of
the attacks. The very purpose of many online attacks is to force victims off the net; the
mobs are likely to respond with particular venom against a victim who not only stays
online but tries to fight back. A victim may plausibly conclude that more people will see
the defamatory or private material if she responds than if she does not.”)
241
id., at 425-427 (discussing the Segev incident).
242
id., at 426 (citing the text of ReputationDefender’s message: “We are writing to
you today because our client, Ronnie Segev, has told us that he would like the content
about him on your website to be removed as it is outdated and disturbing to him. Would
you be willing to remove or alter the content? It would mean so much to Mr Segev, and to
us. Considerate actions such as these will go a long way to help make the Internet a more
civil place.”)
238

50

Combating Cyber-Victimization

[Draft: July 31, 2010]

blogger from the website wrote a scathing post entitled “Ronnie Segev and
ReputationDefender Can Eat a Dick”.243
Another limitation of private reputation management services is that
they cannot do much in the face of personal attacks directed at a victim,
rather than posted publicly online. The tools utilized by reputation
management services do not specifically address situations where a person
is, say, sending harassing and abusive communications directly to a victim.
In the Megan Meier scenario, for example, where harmful communications
are directly sent to the victim, there is little that a private reputation
management service can do. This may be a situation where legal solutions
are more appropriate. Victims of such abuses can, in relevant jurisdictions,
rely on cyberbullying and cyber harassment laws if police and prosecutors
are prepared to act on the complaints.244
D. Effective Reputation Management
1. Enhanced Access to Reputation Management Services
Empowering individuals to fight online abuses themselves requires a
number of strategies, many of which rely largely on the availability of
funding and public education. For example, pro bono legal services could
be encouraged to take on more online abuse cases if they could be staffed
and funded to do so. There is also no reason why more pro bono reputation
management services could not be developed if government or other
funding were available.
The development of more pro-bono reputation management services
and public education initiatives would be a useful supplement to currently
available commercial reputation management services. As noted above,
commercial services are expensive and out of the reach of many victims of
online abuses.245 At the same time, some of the tools they utilize are
readily available to private individuals who know how to use them.246 If
victims of online abuses had better information about some of these tools,
they could more easily protect themselves online without necessarily
having to pay for a commercial reputation management service.
243

id.
See discussion in Part I.A, supra.
245
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FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, Chapters 10-13 (advising individuals and
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If appropriate funding were available, victims might also have the
option of using a pro bono reputation management service. Naturally the
choice to pay for a commercial service would still be available. If
individuals were savvier about protecting their own reputations online and
more pro bono options were available, the commercial services may be
incentivized to develop even more sophisticated solutions to online abuses.
They would after all be competing for increasingly technologically
sophisticated clients with more practical options. This could ultimately
lead to the development of new innovations for protecting individual
reputations.
Access to existing legal remedies for online abuses might also be
improved if pro bono legal services were better equipped to take on these
cases. Many legal clinics and other pro bono services might not deal with
many of these cases because of unfamiliarity with the relevant laws, or
assessment of current law as not adequately covering the victims’ harms.247
A reworking of laws, and increased funding and education to those
providing pro bono services to victims of online harassment, might usefully
redress the balance here.
2. Cyber-Abuse Hotlines
Another extra-legal approach to protecting online reputation is the
increased use of Internet hotlines that can be established on a voluntary
basis by various online service providers.248 Users of online services can be
empowered to report online abuses by telephone, fax, email, or submission
of an online form. Hotlines should ideally be as confidential as possible,
and those who claim abuse should be given some information about how
complaints will be handled and the circumstances under which complaints
may be referred to a public authority.249 Of course, this assumes the
existence of an appropriate authority to deal with relevant complaints.
The British Internet Watch Foundation exemplifies the hotline
approach in reporting illegal online conduct involving certain types of
Internet content including: (a) sexual images of children; (b) obscene adult
content; (c) material inciting racial hatred; and, (d) inappropriate behavior
towards a child online.250 Users can report such content in a variety of
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248
249
250

Discussion with clinical Professor Laura McNally, March 15, 2010.
Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 29 (critiquing several existing Internet hotlines).
id.
See www.iwf.org.uk/reporting.htm, last viewed on May 19, 2010.
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ways including submission of an online form.251 In the United States, the
CyberTipline is another example of a hotline for reporting certain damaging
conduct much of which involves children: for example, child prostitution,
child molestation, and sex tourism involving children.252
Some of the more salient advantages of hotlines in the context of
online abuses include the fact that they can open up channels of
communication between victims, observers of harmful conduct, and law
enforcement authorities.253 Hotlines also enable ready collection of data
about online abuses including data about the nature of prevalent abuses and
demographic characteristics of typical abusers and victims.254 Hotlines can
thus enable law enforcement agencies to gain a clearer picture of online
abusive conduct and to target enforcement activities appropriately. Reports
generated by hotlines, when released to the public, can also serve an
important public education function, increasing awareness of damaging
online conduct and enabling individuals, pro bono and private services to
develop targeted tools to respond to specific abuses.
3. Evolving Online Norms
Social norms interact with other regulatory modalities in cyberspace
as in the physical world. Norms both influence and respond to legal and
market developments. For example, a law may alter normative behavior by
requiring compliance or simply by expressing appropriate behavioral
standards.255 Markets will often respond to online norms: for example,
reputation management businesses developed as society became less civil
online and a market demand grew for tools to protect individual reputations.
The question today is how to develop norms that foster more civil and
accountable online communities.
One approach is to develop online forums that promote community
standards of responsibility and accountability. For example, to counter the
Juicy Campus debacle,256 a Princeton student created the
“ownwhatyouthink.com” website, asking students to pledge not to visit
anonymous gossip sites and to be accountable for their own online
251
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communications.257 The site sports the banner headline: “Anonymity =
Cowardice”.258
Of course, norms may work in opposing directions and society – or
large sectors of society – may simply become desensitized to many online
abuses. As one commentator has noted: “Maybe we soon will simply
yawn in boredom the next time we see a tweet typed in an inebriated rant,
or a Facebook photo of a friend – or perhaps even ourselves – dancing on a
table with bloodshot eyes.”259 Even if we become desensitized to these
kinds of communications, one would hope that we never become
desensitized to dangerous and harmful conduct like cyberbullying and
harassment involving threats of physical harm, or online communications
that seriously damage an individual’s livelihood or reputation.
4. Industry Self-Regulation
Market self-regulation initiatives may also be an important part of
the regulatory matrix. Self-regulation may be adopted voluntarily or may
be a result of pressure from customers or from governments. In the cyberabuse context, the relevant industry is difficult to define. Online abuses
occur in a variety of online forums including social networking sites, blogs
and even online multi-player games. Search engines like Google will be
implicated here because they play such a significant role in determining
which Internet users see what information. Self-regulation initiatives in at
least some industries might serve an important educational and normative
function for those involved in online communications more generally.
Facebook’s attempts to use members’ information for advertising
has been one area where user norms and preferences have often conflicted
with Facebook’s business plans, and Facebook has attempted to respond
accordingly.260 An example of the interplay between government and
market regulation in the social networking context is the 2008 Joint
Statement on Key Principles of Social Networking Sites Safety adopted
between MySpace and the state Attorneys-General.261 These principles are
aimed at protecting children from inappropriate and harmful online conduct.
257
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They encompass strategies such as developing software tools to protect
children from harmful content,262 designing social networking sites in a way
that prevents minors from accessing inappropriate conduct,263 educating
parents and children about online safety issues,264 and ensuring that social
networking sites cooperate with law enforcement agencies in protecting
children online.265
Another aspect of self-regulation that could be facilitated by
cooperation between online user groups or by government regulation is the
prospect of labeling, naming and shaming websites that provide a platform
for cyber-wrongs. For example, several years ago in the United Kingdom,
the culture minister and her shadow minister presented the idea that online
service providers might be named and shamed into dealing more
proactively with violent and sexually explicit conduct on their sites.266 This
is a difficult result to achieve in practice because it involves cooperation
between a central agency and some realistic pressure brought to bear on
websites to take action against harmful online conduct. Additionally,
because of the global nature of the Internet, definitions of “harmful
conduct” may vary from community to community and country to country.
Some countries, with stronger free speech protections, may protect speech
that others sanction. Of course, certain speech – like realistic threats of
harm – should not be protected anywhere. However, beyond that, it is
difficult to draw clear lines about what kinds of conduct should lead to
naming and shaming.
Some other recent examples of self-regulation involve Google’s
relatively new Google Search Wiki and Google Profile service.267 Google’s
experimental Search Wiki enables Internet users to make comments on
search results.268 Thus, a victim of reputational harm could use the service
to contextualize or refute a criticism made about her. However, the Search
Wiki comments are not displayed unless an Internet searcher goes out of his
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way to enable them.269 Additionally, anyone can comment on any search
result, so there is no way for an Internet user to screen for true or false
comments.270 Google now also offers a Google Profile service that enables
individuals to write a brief profile about themselves.271 These profiles may
be displayed at the bottom of Google search results for personal names.272
However, this service is currently limited in its impact because of the
placement of the profiles at the bottom of a page of search results where
they may be missed by a searcher.273 Additionally, they have limited use
for people with common names.274
Another form of self-regulation which is potentially relevant to the
protection of online reputation is the Wikipedia online dispute resolution
service. It is more and more common for individuals to be profiled on
Wikipedia which is a participatory and interactive repository for knowledge
on many different subjects.275 The participatory nature of Wikipedia means
that an individual will not necessarily control information about her that
may be posted on a Wikipedia page.276 Wikipedia has its own online
dispute resolution procedure to verify the accuracy of information posted,
and this may be utilized by individuals harmed by false or decontextualized
postings.277 While this approach is specific to Wikipedia, there is no reason
why other online service providers could not adopt similar approaches if
they wanted to assist their users in combating reputational harms.
IV. Conclusions
“The Internet is a powerful and wonderful tool that has ushered in a new
information age. If purposely misused, however, the internet can be terrifying, and
278
even deadly.”
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The Internet is an unparalleled global communications medium.
However, online interactions can be harmful, leading to emotional suffering
and physical harm. The current legal system has gone some way towards
protecting victims of online harms. However, the law still has a long way
to go. Legal remedies will always suffer limitations related to time, cost,
and jurisdictional challenges in a borderless online world. Further, the
embarrassment and humiliation often associated with a victim bringing a
complaint will chill much legal action.
Like many other aspects of Internet regulation, effective responses
to online abuse will require a multi-modal regulatory framework.
Regulatory modalities such as social norms, public education and market
forces will need to interact to create more comprehensive responses to
online abuses. Reputation management services play an important role in
this regulatory matrix, but are subject to their own limitations. Current
approaches to online abuse might be improved if the existing commercial
services could be supplemented with more easily affordable pro bono
services, and if individuals could be empowered themselves to engage
proactively in reputation management strategies. Increased funding for,
and use of, hotlines would also be a step forward both in combating specific
abuses and in providing more reliable and comprehensive data about online
abuses. Attempts at industry self regulation, potentially in concert with
government incentives, would also be a useful development.
A number of the proposals made in this article would require
funding which is always a tall order, particularly in troubled economic
times. On a more positive note, most of the suggestions made here are not
particularly difficult to implement. They predominantly take advantage of
tools already available and apply them in new ways. The extra-legal
remedies advocated here also have the advantage that they do not rely on
government action other than potentially some funding, so they do not run
into significant First Amendment concerns.279 Additionally, enhancing
private mechanisms avoids some of the problems typically inherent in
litigating to identify and to assert jurisdiction over often anonymous or
pseudonymous defendants. Tackling online abuses is a global problem.
Private bodies acting in concert with each other and with domestic
governments have a better chance of reaching optimum solutions than
governments acting alone.
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For example, governments are generally permitted to fund programs that impact
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